Foreword

The title of this volume – *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century* – sums up many of the dilemmas and challenges facing policy-makers today. First, environmental change is global; no part of the world is spared. Second, we have to face change now; ignoring the challenge is not an option if our children are to thrive. Third, in an increasingly connected world, security is more than just the absence of war; it depends on diverse, but linked – indeed, often competing - factors such as political, social, economic, and environmental interests. Central to these, as the title of this book suggests, is the environment.

As a large and economically powerful union, the EU enjoys economies of scale. These can be exploited to address environmental threats - at local, national, and Union levels. It is sobering to recall, however, that even the enlarged EU is not autonomous and that the health of the European environment also depends on policies and practices in other parts of the world. Nowhere is this more evident than with climate change. Changes and challenges are now global, and thus our policy responses must be global too. Our security is indivisible, but our responses remain all too clearly fractured and divided.

Second, the concept of 'sustainable development' shows that time is a crucial factor in environmental security. The future can only be secured insofar as we act responsibly now; prevarication will have costs which future generations will pay. This implies urgent choices now. Fortunately, the developing science of costing environmental goods and services suggests that taking action on the environment not only has costs, but also has significant short- to medium-term financial and other benefits. Nonetheless, questions remain as to when best to take action and how such action can accommodate political and economic timetables.

Third, the environment is indeed a key component of modern security. Environmental degradation may destabilize societies by reducing economic opportunity. Degraded environments can be breeding grounds for other social ills, such as impaired human health or declining social cohesion. Developing countries with populations directly dependent on environmental resources are also particularly vulnerable to conflict over access to limited or declining resources. Environment is thus central to modern security, but also needs to be integrated with other factors such as energy, mobility, and food requirements. The question for policy-makers is how, in practical terms, to align these diverse interests.

Since the end of the Cold War, the security debate has changed fundamentally. A study which addresses the new challenges and suggests responses will therefore be a welcome addition to the policy-maker's toolkit. For this reason, I warmly welcome this volume.

Brussels, in June 2007

Stavros Dimas
Commissioner for the
Environment, European Union

Foreword

This volume on *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century* implements the mission of the United Nations University of advancing knowledge for human security, peace, and development. This volume, written by over 100 experts from all continents, combines the two research programmes of UNU on 'environment and sustainable development' as well as on 'peace and governance'.

It addresses the question whether the fundamental change of the international order since the end of the Cold War has triggered a reconceptualizing of security not only in the OECD world but also in Africa, Asia and Latin America as it has been perceived by scholars from many disciplines as well as by government and international organization officials.

This book addresses the conceptual linkages between the four key goals of the United Nations system of security, peace, development and the environment, the conceptualization of security in Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism as well as in Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinking, in the philosophical and ethical traditions in the Orient and Occident as well as in the pre- and post-Columbian philosophy in Latin America. The book discusses also the spatial context and dimensions of security concepts, their reconceptualization in different disciplines and in international organizations within the UN system, OSCE, the European Union, OECD and NATO, and the conclusions that have been drawn in different regions and by regional organizations since 1990 and how this is reflected in alternative perspectives on future security.

The nine editors of this major scientific reference book – three women from India, Mexico and Kenya as well as six men from Europe, North America and the Arab world – offer multidisciplinary and multicultural analyses to key concepts of the UN Charter: 'international peace and security' and how these concepts have changed since 1990.

This reconceptualization debate on security was partly triggered by several reports of two Secretaries-Generals of the United Nations: *The Agenda for Peace* by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 and by the report *In Larger Freedom* by Kofi Annan in 2005 as well as by initiatives by UNDP, UNESCO and also by research conducted by the United Nations University.

This volume is the third in the *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace*. The 'hexagon' is also the logo of the UNU system that combines under the goal of human security five research areas on peace, governance, development, science, technology and society as well as the environment.

This unique compilation of global scholarship deserves many readers and should be available in all major university and research libraries in all parts of the world and for all scholars also on the Internet.

Tokyo, June 2007

Hans van Ginkel
Rector, United Nations University and
United Nations Under-Secretary-General

Foreword

This volume on *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century* in the *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* argues that the most immediate concerns for most human beings are soft threats to our common security, including those posed by environmental problems. Poverty, environmental degradation, and despair have killed people, and affected societies and nations in the global South.

As security policies insufficiently address environmental concerns a complementary approach based on North-South cooperation through sustainable development is needed. Sustainable development has become the precautionary aspect of peace policy.

UNEP's work on environment and conflict was based on three pillars: a) its *Post-Conflict Assessment Unit*, which assesses environmental conditions in post-conflict zones; b) the *Environment and Security Initiative* (ENVSEC) by UNEP, UNDP and OSCE in Southeaster Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia; and c) UNEP's *Division on Early Warning and Assessment* (DEWA) that launched an 'Environment and Conflict Prevention Initiative'.

Environmental conflict and cooperation are still under-theorized, and many case studies on the sub-national level are needed. The research community should identify risk factors of environmental conflict and best practices for environmental cooperation that can support the efforts of international organizations. For Kofi Annan 'soft' threats can be more pressing concerns than traditional dangers for national security.

In this volume 92 scholars and officials from all continents are assembled by an able team of nine co-editors from nine countries, among them three women from New Delhi, Nairobi and Cuernavaca and six men from Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Tunisia and the United States. They analyze the new conceptual and policy linkages that have been added to the initial task of the UN system to maintain 'international peace and security', i.e. development and the environment. Environmental challenges due to climate change, desertification, water scarcity and degradation have increasingly posed new security threats, vulnerabilities and risks that ignore national borders. They can only by mitigated by effective global and regional multilateral cooperation. Avoiding these new types of conflicts triggered by these new security dangers and concerns by environmental cooperation and peacemaking must become a political priority of utmost urgency for the 21st century.

This book deserves many readers in all parts of the world, especially in those countries where university and research libraries may not be able to afford such references books. It is hoped that these scientific and policy-relevant messages can again be made available with the support of private foundations and donors to the young generation in the global South that will experience many of these challenges to their security and survival during this century.

Höxter, June 2007

Klaus Töpfer
Former Under-Secretary General of the United Nations and Executive-Director, United Nations Environment Programme (1997–2006)

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

Rethinking Security in the New Century – Return to the Grotean Pattern

Jonathan Dean

Responding to 1989: Towards Cooperative Security

The main business of human society is to safeguard the life of its members. This rich and fascinating volume surveys the many ways of protecting humankind against the threats to human life in today's world – armed conflict in all its forms, inhumane treatment, disease, natural catastrophe, the consequences of man-made environmental degradation, and scarcity of food, water and health care. The emphasis of the book is on the years since the end of the Cold War in 1989-90, and on the challenges to security, old and new, with a special focus on environmental and human security, which have arisen in that period.

As we will describe further, a pattern of transatlantic cooperation among governments and civil society groups to cope with security challenges began to emerge in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. With important exceptions, this pattern continued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and into the post-cold war period. This trend confirmed Grotius' analysis of the human condition – the global nature of human society, its solidarity in agreeing on rules and new forms of cooperation to meet challenges to human life, and its emphasis on the importance of individuals and groups as well as of states, which – despite devolution of their powers to supra- and sub-national entities – remain the main units of the international system.

The events of the years since 1989-90 have in general shown a worldwide trend of cooperation in dealing with man- and nature-made crises. They have largely repudiated the Hobbesian use-of-force approach. At the same time, they have provided renewed evidence that the world is not ready for a central governmental authority. Although efforts to control war showed some improvement in this period, attempts to deal with human-caused environmental degradation made little progress in blocking a process which in time may make this planet uninhabitable for human population. Rapid increase of that population is one cause of the problem.

New Security Challenges: Unilateral American Responses

The major events of the years since 1989-90 included a worldwide cooperative effort in the 1991 Gulf War to repulse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The widespread terrorist attacks on Western and other targets from the early 1990's to the present have failed to bring the popular uprisings in the Muslim states in support of the fundamentalist cause hoped for by terrorist leaders. However, they did elicit worldwide anti-terrorist cooperation of police, intelligence, and finance control, and the beginnings of cooperative efforts to deal with some of the underlying causes of terrorism. Fears of terrorist use of WMD remain widespread, although in fact the main terrorist weapon has remained conventional high explosives.

The U.S. military action in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, although deliberately unilateral and refusing many offers of help, was quite widely supported in world opinion. However, the U.S.-UK military action against Iraq in March 2003 broke radically with the pattern of cooperative engagement of previous U.S. administrations. It showed the costly effects of a go-it-alone policy, including inability to use the international institutions – UN weapons inspection and the Security Council – which might have neutralized the

Iraqi regime. The consequence was U.S. inability to elicit more than token military, political, and economic cooperation in dealing with Iraq, capped by unwillingness of the Bush administration to devote the military and economic resources needed to cope with the task in Iraq. This outcome clearly showed the limits of U.S. 'super-power' and the unambiguous need for a cooperative approach.

Grotius on Preventive Attack

It is interesting to recall that wide international disapproval of the Bush administration's doctrine of preventive attack had been foreshadowed by Hugo Grotius (1625), when he said "to maintain that the bare probability of some remote or future annoyance from a neighbouring state affords a just grounds of hostile aggression, is a doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity." (*On the Law of War and Peace*, Book II, Chapter I, para. XVII).[1] Pointing to the crucial difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence about an adversary's intentions, Grotius points out that action in self-defence is not justified "unless we are certain, not only regarding the power of our neighbour, but also regarding his intention." (Book II, Chapter 22, para. IV).

Natural Disasters of 2004/2005 and Cooperative Security Responses

Natural catastrophes in the form of the December 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, equally devastating hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in late summer 2005, and a huge earthquake in Kashmir and Northern Pakistan in October of 2005 brought cooperative efforts to temper the disasters. There was during 2005 worthwhile cooperation between the U.S. government, WHO, the EU, and Asian governments in preparing defences against the avian flu. After long delays in each case, the United States joined Japan, South Korea, Russia and China in negotiating to curb the nuclear capabilities of North Korea, and with the UK, France and Germany in seeking to prevent development of nuclear weapons by Iran.

But the devastation of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast revealed the existence of an underprivileged underclass, while in November 2005, youth riots in Muslim suburbs of French cities suddenly exploded out of years of low social regard and extremely limited job and career opportunities and could portend serious confrontations ahead.

Two Hundred Years of Cooperative Security

I have mentioned the emergence of cooperative efforts to control war in the Napoleonic period. Two hundred years ago, as the Napoleonic wars were bringing casualties of millions and huge political disruption, a new phenomenon emerged in the history of war. It consisted of two components. The first was establishment of multinational public peace societies proposing a wide range of institutions for avoiding or controlling war, like compulsory arbitration by a neutral international umpire and agreed limitation of arms.

Often in history there has been intense public opposition to specific wars, for example, the opposition in Russia to continuing World War I which led to the Bolshevik Revolution, and the opposition to the Vietnam War in the United States and elsewhere. But what happened in the early nineteenth century after acceptance of war over millennia as desirable or at least as a given component of human history, was the emergence of organizations which categorically opposed war as such. The names and dates of the new organizations in the U.S. and UK were significant: *The Massachusetts Peace Society* (1814), the *New York Peace Society* (1815), the *London Peace Society* (1816), and the *American Peace Society* (1828). These associations agitated for peace and against war through public meetings, pamphlets and tracts, and by lobbying with governments. From the outset, and throughout the nineteenth century, these associations collaborated with organizations in the United States on the one hand and organizations in Great Britain, France, Belgium and Germany on the other, forming a transatlantic community of peace interests. The Western European peace associations were from the outset sceptical of the efforts to achieve categorical rejection of war energetically pursued by the Americans, preferring to promote specific measures to avoid or limit war.

1 See: Grotius (1625, 1975, 1990) for free download at: http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/8098/; on Grotius: Bull/ Kingsbury/Roberts (1992); Edwards (1981), Onuma (2001), Tuck (2001, 2005).

Cooperative Security since the Vienna Final Act of 1815

The second component was the radical innovations of ongoing cooperation among the victors in war, in this case the victors over Napoleon, to maintain the peace. A large part of the credit for this change was due to far-sighted British policy. Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger began to plan the post-war peacekeeping structure in the 1790's. British cash was used to pay off the other main victors over Napoleon – the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia – to keep them engaged in the peace process. The four governments formed the Quadripartite Alliance and negotiated the 1815 Vienna Final Act setting forth the terms of the European peace settlement. The British urged that representatives of the four victorious powers meet periodically to discuss and decide on issues arising from the implementation of the Vienna Final Act and to ensure the peace of Europe. To keep a friendly eye on France and to engage French resources in the post-war settlement, France was later admitted to the Quadripartite Alliance, much as defeated Federal Germany was admitted to the NATO alliance over a century later. Continuing Pitt's far-sighted cooperative approach to security, British Foreign Secretary Canning extended to the Western hemisphere a prohibition against territorial acquisition by European states. Cooperation between the British Navy and a much weaker U.S. Navy created a transatlantic zone of peace.[2]

Over the years, European and American peace associations and governments collaborated in a series of agreements limiting war, like the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, the first Geneva Convention (1864) and the agreements at the first and second Hague Peace Conferences. The Concert of Europe lasted only until 1822 in its full form, but for many years peacetime coordination by ambassadors and senior officials continued and reached many agreements. The important innovation of ongoing peacetime coordination of international security by the victors in war was replicated and expanded by the victors in World War I and World War II in the form of the League of Nations and of the United Nations.

As we have seen, by the middle of the nineteenth century, Western – i.e. American, British and Western European – governments and public associations were nagged in close dialogue, exchange of ideas, and in intermittent collaboration on preventing and controlling war and were establishing institutions and treaties to this end. In fact, a rudimentary global security system was emerging through this transatlantic collaboration.

This collaboration continued throughout the nineteenth century. And, in fact, despite, or because of, the failure of World War I and of World War II, it continued through the twentieth century.

This is not the place to attempt to describe the reasons why, after thousands of years of warfare throughout human history, a revolutionary change in public and also governmental attitudes toward war began to emerge in the early nineteenth century, but at least some of the underlying causes for this radical change seem evident. They include: (1) technological weapon innovation and the mounting carnage, destruction, and cost of war; (2) modern communications and media, which rapidly brought news of military events to publics as well as government officials; (3) social factors, including rising levels of income and education after the Industrial Revolution – this broadened the intellectual horizons of governmental officials and encouraged participation of publics in issues of war and peace; (4) changing, shared values of government officials and publics. These included the emergence of the Grotean idea of a known planet occupied by members of a single species. Finally, (5) the growth of democratic governments and institutions enhanced the influence of the electorate on security and other issues, and the openness of governments to public opinion. Growing understanding and cooperation in the especially difficult area of controlling war and armed conflict was accompanied by the growth of a habit of international cooperation in coping with natural disasters.

Shift from Cooperative to Unilateral Security Policy?

The trend toward global cooperation in a wide variety of areas was continued after the end of the Cold War by skilful diplomacy in the administration of George H.W. Bush, with the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. But the trend toward increasing international cooperation was then sharply broken by the second Bush administration, intoxicated by its situation as the sole superpower, and determined to wield its power without the limitations imposed by allies.

To find the reasons for this sharp break in U.S. policy, we have to go back to the foundation of the

2 See e.g.: Holsti 1991; Kissinger 1994; Osiander 1994.

United States in revolution against established power, its population by political refugees of all kinds, and to the growth of the concept that the United States were especially favoured by divine providence in its institutions and values. At the outset of the twentieth century, a large (25 per cent) component of the American electorate was characterized by attitudes of suspicion and superiority to the outside world and a desire to be isolated from it. But for over 75 years, from World War I to the end of the Cold War, public manifestation of the isolationist position in the U.S. was considered unpatriotic and suppressed through public disapproval. During this period, the reality of the outside world and of American military power became evident to all, including the isolationists. The end of the Cold War removed the pressure of public disapproval and abruptly released the pent-up forces of American isolationism in the transmuted form of heavily armed, highly nationalistic unilateralism, which captured control of the Congress in 1994 and of the presidency in 2000.

Returning to the Cooperative Tradition of Security Policy

Policy errors, military reverses, denial of cooperation by foreign governments, and the growing disaffection of the American electorate have tempered some of the hubristic excesses of the administration of George W. Bush. The chances are good that after one or two congressional election cycles and a presidential election, the United States will rejoin its own cooperative tradition of the past century and that the trend toward a cooperative world security system will be resumed, with greater U.S.-European collaboration at the UN, in controlling armed violence, and in coping with the environment.

Peace, Development, Ecology and Security
IPRA 40 Years alter Groningen

Úrsula Oswald Spring

Four Objectives: Peace, Development, Ecology and Security

> *We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, ... and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be obtained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.*

The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, foresaw the conceptual tension between "*we the peoples*" as the reference object of the political debate and scientific discourse on 'human security' and the 'states' or 'nations' as the key actors and objects of activities related to 'national' and 'international security'. 'National' vs. 'human security' has been in the centre of the political debate and scientific discourse on 'reconceptualization of security' that has emerged since the various turns in world history in the late 20th century: the end of the Cold War (1989), the implosion of the Soviet Union (1991) that ended the prevailing bipolar structure of global politics where nuclear deterrence, doctrines of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and an intensive arms race determined by fear, uncertainty as well as technological imperatives, and driven by a security dilemma absorbed more than 1,000 billion US dollars annually for a huge militarized global economy with 'baroque' (Kaldor 1982) features.

In Latin America the major turning points have been the end of the military dictatorships, the third wave of democratization in the 1980's, and the 'lost decade' due to the long-lasting economic crises; in East Asia the end of the Maoist period in China and the financial crisis of the 1990's, and in Africa the peaceful transformation of South Africa as well as the progressing failure of the state, and the increase of internal violence dominated by warlords and their criminal allies.

This duality is also reflected in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter where Art. 1 stated: "to maintain international peace and security", "to develop friendly relations among nations", "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". To achieve "international peace and security" have been the guiding principles of the United Nations since 1945, while the "international problems" of development and environment have been added later into the UN agenda with the process of decolonization and national independence, and the concern for environmental challenges since the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972.

This preface essay briefly sketches the contextual changes and the lost utopias of the 20th century, the increasing global development gap leading to new development and security linkages before turning to the fragile democracies in Latin America, with poverty and intensifying social cleavages. The preface then turns to peace research, to the first forty years of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) and the impact of peace researchers on the peace process in Latin America.

Contextual Changes and Lost Utopias in the 20th Century

During the 20th century, the Mexican Revolution (1910), followed by the October Revolution in Russia (1917), created a socialist utopia with the goal to redistribute political and economic power to peasants and workers. The *Russian Revolution* led by Lenin and later Stalin, divided the world into capitalism and communism. During the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union, internal repression and purges crushed any criticism. In Europe, the competition for imperial dominance between the German and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the United Kingdom and France led to the First World War (1914–1918), which changed the global geopolitical order, the political context in Europe and in the colonies. The gradual emergence of two new world powers: the United States and the Soviet Union with competing political, economic and social systems, could not avoid World War II. The alliance between Britain, France and United States on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other, defeated Nazi Germany in 1945. However, the trauma of two devastating wars with 20 million deaths after the First and 50 million deaths after the Second World War left deep wounds.

In order to consolidate world peace, 51 nations founded the United Nations Organization (UNO) with a Security Council which is tasked to respond to threats of peace and to foster peaceful cooperation among and to prevent the emergence of conflicts. But at the summit of Yalta in February 1945, a new division of Europe in two spheres of influence was created that evolved into a bipolar global order with an intensive arms race. The competition between both ideological blocks stimulated the growth of science and technology, especially in the military and aerospace sector. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched 'Sputnik' as an initial step for the conquest of outer space. During the war and post-war period the knowledge in medicine, pharmacy, vaccines against polio, smallpox and measles, and antibiotics grew rapidly.

In 1989, the euphoria after the fall of the Berlin wall and the hope for a less conflictive world was quickly drowned in old and new-armed confrontations. Instead of using the financial resources as a peace dividend for resolving poverty and its consequences, new conflicts and international terrorism gave birth to a new arms build-up primarily by the sole remaining superpower, comprising weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Today seven countries are recognized nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan), one country is assumed to have nuclear weapons (Israel) and a few other countries have been claimed by the US as 'rogue states' trying to acquire such weapons (Iran, North Korea) while no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq in 2003, and Libya has given up its ambitions to acquire such weapons.

The conflictive situations in South East and East Asia with the Korean (1950–1953) and the Vietnam War (1963–1975), in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as between Iraq, Iran and Kuwait (1980–1988, 1990–1991), in Africa and in many countries of Asia (Riegel 2001) have led to a systematic reflection on peace, conflict resolution and non-violence that has lead during the Cold War to the emergence of a value-oriented and critical scientific research programme focusing on peace and conflict research with the goal to overcome this global conflict structure with peaceful change.

Development and Security: The Development Gap

After five decades of development strategies and multiple programmes the North-South gap in terms of GDP has grown, as has the income gap between rich and poor within countries (CEPAL 2004). This gap is especially critical for those countries with high levels of poverty, malnourishment, subsistence crops, raw material exports, and insufficient educational facilities and infrastructure, leading often to failing state institutions in the so-called 'Fourth World' (Nuscheler 1995; Arnsprenger 1999). Old colonial structures have undermined independence through inherited borders dividing people, neo-colonialism and warlords, linked to the personal interest of elites and "belly politics" (Bayart 1993), thus transforming parts of Sub-Sahara Africa into 'failed states' (Tetzlaff 2003). Most industrialized countries have remained indifferent to this human drama that has become even more urgent due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic that has killed millions of people and worsened social and political conditions in many countries (Ngoma/Le Roux in this volume; Poku 2008), thus mortgaging the future socio-economic development of these countries (Horkheimer/Adorno 1947).

In this complex socio-economic and environmental context, new threats for collective and personal security have emerged. They have been further aggra-

vated by global climate change, increase of disasters, chaotic urbanization, unemployment, terrorist acts, organized crime, illegal migration, structural discrimination of women, and violence in families that often led to survival strategies of young people. The coexistence of these phenomena offers scientists and peace researchers a renewed opportunity to rethink the importance of development processes with the goal to improve environmental and human security.

Undoubtedly the development paradigm has become more complex (Küng/Senghaas 2004), but also more similar between developing countries and the poor. It has been homogenized by the process of globalization and characterized by instant world communications (Castells 2002; Habermas 2001a), financial flows (Mesjasz 2003), and increasing trade interdependence (Solis/Diaz/Ángeles 2002), controlled by multinational enterprises (Kaplan 2003; Saxe-Fernandez 2004). Free market ideology, private competition, deregulation and increasing privatization processes and mergers of enterprise (WB, IMF, G-7), linked to a shrinking state intervention, are the new 'growth motors' championed by multinational enterprises and the multilateral organizations of Bretton Woods (World Bank, International Monetary Found), as well as the World Trade Organization.

This economic model of late capitalism (Habermas 1995; Saxe Fernández 2003; Oswald Spring 2004) has concentrated income and wealth but also augmented unemployment, increasingly excluding young and old people from the labour market, and relying on temporary female workers with lower standards. This model has been politically and military supported by a superpower and its allies and the economic elites in developing countries. Military superiority and an increasing homogenized culture based on consumerism and mass media manipulation (Castells 2002) have created four main conflict foci: a) poverty, marginalization and exclusion; b) militarism and physical violence; c) gender, indigenous and minority discrimination; and d) environmental destruction with natural resource depletion.

Fragile Democracies, Poverty, and Income Gap in Latin America

In the 1960's and 1970's, dependency theories emerged from Latin America that have been developed further into a centre-periphery approach by Senghaas (1972) and to a 'structural imperialism' by Galtung (1975). Asia contributed its experiences with non-violence and 'ahimsa' that led first to independence of India and later to peace education. The non-violent movement for racial liberation in the US, inspired by Martin Luther King, provided another input. In the rainbow nation of South Africa, the peaceful transition from Apartheid and repression to democracy was crucial for future peace efforts in Latin America (e.g. in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala) and in Asia (India, Pakistan and other internal conflicts) during the 1990's. The reconciliation processes between victimizers and victims created models of multidimensional integration and 'Truth Commissions' promoting democratization processes.

Nevertheless, the results of five decades of development are disappointing, with at least two lost decades in Latin America. The increasing concern with poverty, urbanization, and climate change has led the *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP 1994) to shift the traditional narrow security focus linked to nation states to a new concept, directly related to people, it termed as 'human security' to complement its goal of 'human development'. For UNDP human security focuses on life and dignity instead of military threats, and includes "protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards" (UNDP 1994: 23).

The Canadian and Norwegian governments have promoted 'human security' as part of a new foreign policy and *Weltanschauung* with a focus on 'freedom from fear' in order "to provide security so individuals can pursue their lives in peace" (Krause 2004). According to the Canadian Foreign Ministry "Lasting security cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives". The threats are posed by interstate and intrastate conflicts, crimes, domestic violence, terrorism, small arms, inhumane weapons and antipersonnel landmines, which requires a strict application of the rule of law with transparent national, regional and local judicial courts and mechanisms, the fulfilment of human rights law and education, including good governance, democracy, respecting minorities and conflict prevention (Dedring in this volume).

The Japanese approach has focused on 'freedom from want' and it "comprehensively covers all menaces that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity ... and strengthens efforts to confront these threats", such as diseases, poverty, financial crises, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, land degradation, deforestation, environmental hazards, population growth, migration, ter-

rorism, drug production and trafficking. At the initiative of Japan a *Commission on Human Security* (CHS) was established in 2001 promoting public understanding, engagement, and support for human security; developing the concept as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation, and proposing concrete programmes to address critical threats. *Human Security Now* (CHS 2003) supports the Millennium Development Goals within a people-centred security framework, by offering 2.8 billion persons a prospect for a life with dignity that suffer from poverty, bad health, illiteracy, and violence (Shinoda 2008).

With regard to Latin America the economic crises and the persistence of poverty – closely related to the neoliberal model adopted by most governments and their elites – has widened the internal income gap, destroyed the middle class, and reduced the job prospects for most young people. The euphoria with overcoming the military regimes and electing democratic governments collapsed with the increasing crises. In the early 21st century most people seem to prefer an authoritarian government and economic stability over a democratic system of rule (see chapter 26 by Oswald in this volume).

Latin America has the most unequal income distribution in the world, with a concentration of wealth in small elites. Between 1990 and 2002, only five countries improved their economic situation; seven lost and six maintained it (CEPAL 2004). A tendency prevails to concentrate wealth in the upper class, making the middle class and the poor highly vulnerable. Urban and rural women have coped with these crises with their own survival strategies (Oswald 1991). Furthermore, a large number of peasants abandoned their rural livelihood, migrated to urban slums or left illegally for the US.

IPRA 40 Years After Groningen and the Peace Process in Latin America

In 1959, the *Peace Research Institute* in Oslo (PRIO) was founded, and different peace initiatives from the Scandinavian countries have emerged. Their link to women's emancipation movements and the declaration of human rights prepared the soil for a more systematic and international reflection on peace.

In 1962, the *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (WILPF) established a Consultative Commission on peace research. The International Peace Research Newsletter (IPR-N) appeared the following year, and a preliminary meeting was held in Switzerland. In 1964 the *International Peace Research Association* (IPRA) was founded in London and in 1964, Bert Röling (1970) organized its first international meeting in Groningen (The Netherlands).[1] Elise Boulding (1992, 2000) and Kenneth Boulding (USA) were among the intellectual pioneers of peace research and of IPRA in the US.

In the 1960's, new peace research institutes were founded in Northern Europe and in the early 1970's in Central Europe. In Sweden in 1966, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was launched by Gunnar and Alva Myrdal. In 1967 in Copenhagen (Denmark) a small private peace research institute emerged that was later replaced by the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) that became in 2003 part of the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS), and in 1970 in Finland the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) was set up with the support of the Finnish Parliament. Peace and conflict research institutes and programmes were later set up at several other Scandinavian universities, e.g. in Uppsala, Göteborg, Tromsø. Somewhat later, in Germany several peace research institutions were founded.[2]

Since the 1970's, peace research institutes, programmes, units and societies were established in many universities in Europe (e.g. the Swiss Peace Foundation), in North America (), in Mesoamerica (),

1 See: IPRA's history at: http://soc.kuleuven.be/pol/ipra/about/history.html>: Founded in 1964, IPRA developed from a conference organized by the 'Quaker International Conferences and Seminars' in Clarens, Switzerland, 16–20 August 1963. The participants decided to hold international Conferences on Research on International Peace and Security (COROIPAS). Under the leadership of John Burton, the Continuing Committee met in London, 1–3 December 1964. At that time, they took steps to broaden the original concept of holding research conferences. The decision was made to form a professional association with the principal aim of increasing the quantity of research focused on world peace and ensuring its scientific quality. An Executive Committee including Bert V A. Roling, Secretary General (The Netherlands), John Burton (United Kingdom), Ljubivoje Acimovic (Yugoslavia), Jerzy Sawicki (Poland), and Johan Galtung (Norway) was appointed (Galtung 1998). This group was also designated as Nominating Committee for a 15-person Advisory Council to be elected at the first general conference of IPRA, to represent various regions, disciplines, and research interests in developing the work of the Association. See also Kodama (2004) at: <http://soc.kuleuven.be/pol/ipra/downloads/notebook_attachments/IPRApath.pdf>.

in Africa (), and in Asia (Kodama 2004). Later the *International Peace Research Association* (IPRA) was assisted by regional peace research societies, such as the *European Peace Research Association* (EUPRA) and the North American *Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development* (COPRED) that in 2001 merged with the *Peace Studies Association* (PSA) to become The *Peace and Justice Studies Association* (PJSA), the *Latin American Council on Peace Research* (CLAIP), the *Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association* (APPRA) as well as the *African Peace Research Association* (AFPREA). In 1974, IPRA organized its first International Peace Research Association (IPRA): congress in Varanasi (India), in 1977 in Oaxtepec (Mexico), in 1988 in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), and in 1998 in Durban (South Africa), thus gradually overcoming its original basis in OECD and in Socialist countries, learning from the South on issues like nonviolence, conflict resolution, and conciliation processes with Truth Commissions. During the 1970's, peace educators joined peace researchers in IPRA and in the 1980's, peace movements generated a third pillar of the organization.

After 42 years, the balance of IPRA has been positive. Several study groups have changed their initial research subject adapting to the different threats to peace, and other groups have started studying new themes. As an example, the *Food Study Group* changed after 10 years to the *Human Right to Food Group* and finally, split into two commissions: one studying international human rights, especially collaborating with the rights of children and women; and the other group started including environmental rights and the new threats of global warming, water scarcity, and environmental pollution in war and after war regions. This last commission changed four years ago and is presently known as the *Ecology and Peace Commission.*

In 2006 at its 21st conference in Calgary, IPRA's work was taking place in 19 standing Commissions: Art and Peace ; Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building; Eastern Europe ; Ecology and Peace; Forced Migration; Gender and Peace; Global Political Economy; Indigenous Peoples' Rights; Internal Conflicts; International Human Rights; Nonviolence (Kelly/Paige/Gilliart 1992; Glenn 2002); Peace Culture and Communications; Peace Education; Peace History; Peace Movements; Peace Theories; Reconciliation; Religion and Peace; and the Security and Disarmament Commission.

The interrelation of peace education with practical peace learning courses brought peace researchers together with peace movements and gave new dynamism into the organization. Changes in the General Secretariat and Presidency of IPRA from Europe (1964–1979, 1995–2000, 2005–) to Japan (1979–1983, 2000–2005), the US (1983–1987, 1989–1994), to Latin America (1987–1989, 1998–2000) and the Pacific (1994–1998) is a sign that international networks exists and are active in the field of conciliation and theory development. If sometimes tense relations have existed between members, study commissions exist; this itself is a dynamic expression of the complexity of peace research and a challenge for applying theoretical knowledge into practice. However, the critical financial situation of IPRA has made it difficult to designate a Secretary-General from a Southern country, since host universities have to cooperate with the running administrative costs and offer some staff to organize and promote international conferences. This fact is especially important in order to maintain the equilibrium between regions as well as gender balance. During its 42-year history only one Secretary-General and one President of IPRA were women (table 1); however, five of six vice-presidents (1994–2000) were women from Hungary, Germany, Lebanon, Chile and Togo.

In 1977, IPRA held its first international conference in Oaxtepec (Mexico) at a time when this country had accepted refugees from almost all Latin American countries that were expelled by repressive military dictatorships. In 1977, with more than 120 Latin American scholars present, the *Latin American Council of Peace Research* (CLAIP) was created. Its activities were linked to the democratization processes occurring in Latin American nations, and international denunciations of torture, human right infractions, massacres and disappearances of social and political leaders were made internationally (CLAIP, 1979; Mols 2004). Gradually, during the 1980's and

2 In Germany, at the initiative of Federal President Gustav Heinemann a German Society for Peace and Conflict Research (DGFK) was set up in 1970, in 1971 the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (HSFK or PRIF), and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (ISFH) were founded. Later peace research units and programmes were developed at several German universities, e.g. in Tübingen (1970), Münster, Marburg, and Duisburg and as independent non-profit scientific institutions, e.g. AFES-PRESS in 1987; Brauch/Bräunling/Hermle/Mallmann 1969; Brauch 1979; Rittberger/Zürn 1990; Wasmuht 1999. In 2001 an independent German Society for Peace Research (DGFF) was set up in Osnabrück.

Table 1: IPRA Conferences, Secretary Generals and Presidents. **Source:** IPRA Website

IPRA General Conferences		IPRA Secretary Generals/Presidents	
1.	Groningen, the Netherlands (1965)	1964 – 1971	Bert V. A. Roling (the Netherlands)
2.	Tallberg, Sweden (1967)	1971 – 1975	Asbjorn Eide (Norway)
3.	Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia (1969)	1975 – 1979	Raimo Väyrynen (Finland)
4.	Bled, Yugoslavia (1971)	1979 – 1983	Yoshikazu Sakamoto (Japan)
5.	Varanasi, India (1974)	1983 – 1987	Chadwick Alger (USA)
6.	Turku, Finland (1975)	1987 – 1989	Clovis Brigagâo (Brazil)
7.	Oaxtepec, Mexico (1977)	1989 – 1991	Elise Boulding (USA)
8.	Konigstein, FRG (1979)	1991 – 1994	Paul Smoker (USA)
9.	Orillia, Canada (1981)	1995 – 1997	Karlheinz Koppe (Germany)
10.	Gyr, Hungary (1983)	1997 – 2000	Bjørn Møller (Denmark)
11.	Sussex, England (1986)	2000 – 2005	Katsuya Kodama (Japan)
12.	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1988)	2005 –	Luc Reychler (Belgium)
13.	Groningen, the Netherlands (1990)	**Presidents**	
14.	Kyoto, Japan (1992)	The first IPRA President was Kevin Clements (New Zealand, 1994 – 1998).	
15.	Valletta, Malta (1994)	His successor was Úrsula Oswald Spring (Mexico, 1998 – 2000).	
16.	Brisbane, Australia (1996)		
17.	Durban, South Africa (1998)		
18.	Tampere, Finland (2000)		
19.	Suwon, Korea (2002)		
20.	Sopron, Hungary (2004)		
21.	Calgary, Canada (2006)		

1990's, many researchers returned to their countries with democratically elected governments, bringing peace messages with them.

But structural, physical and cultural violence still remained, linked now with organized crime, drug trafficking, gangs, post-war traumas, extreme poverty, chaotic urbanization, and often-illegal international migration. CLAIP members and Latin American (LA) universities are studying these processes of violence, and become directly involved in peace-building processes in South and Central America. The complex situation brought up national and sub-regional peace associations at *FLACSO* (Secretary-General Francisco Rojas) with affiliates in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and the Dominican Republic; the *Pontífica Universidad Católica* of Peru (Felipe Mac Gregor); the *University of Brasilia* (Nielsen Paolo de Pires) and the *Holistic University in Brazil* (Peter Weil); the *University of Peace in Costa Rica*; *Respuesta para la Paz* in Argentina (Sara Horowitz and Diana de la Rúa); and the *Institute of International Relations and Peace Research* (IRIPAZ, Luis Alberto Padilla) in Guatemala. They are researching peace, conflicts and conflict resolution; regional conflict resolution (Haiti, Peru-Ecuador, Bolivia); public policy of conflict prevention and peace; education and peace formation; mediation and negotiation; international relations, development and horizontal cooperation in LA; ongoing changes and threats in Latin America; sustainable development, ecology and disasters; technology of information; globalization, transnationalization and corruption; social exclusion; integration of LA and LA Parliament; defence, small and light armaments and humanitarian aid. Peace efforts in LA were systematized (CLAIP 1979); globalization and peace research reviewed (Oswald 2000); peace was linked to security and democratization processes in LA (Oswald 2002) and non-violent conflict resolution between indigenous and minorities explored (Oswald 2004 and 2004a).

The positive experience of CLAIP, given its links with universities and social movements in the subcontinent, induced the establishment of the *Asian Pacific Peace Research Association,* and the highly conflictive situation in Africa stimulated also the creation of an *African Peace Research Association.* In 1998, the international congress was held in Durban, South Africa, in order to learn from the peaceful transition processes, led by Nelson Mandela. His leadership in Africa involved multiple peace efforts and reconciliation processes between historically divided ethnic groups and struggling clans.

The complexity of socio-economic, environmental, and political conflicts brought IPRA through its

regional associations a larger field of research. New challenges to peace education (Reardon 1996; Reardon/Norland 1994), a growing field to analyze and participate in worldwide peace activism; alternative bottom-up models of governance and women struggling for dignified life conditions obliged IPRA to widen its research perspectives. IPRA showed governments and international organizations that human beings want to live in peace and use processes of non-violent conflict resolution. Conflicts are motors of change and development, but when reoriented to personal ambitions and geopolitical interests mismanaged conflict and change dynamics (Gluckman 1965) can destroy the entire world. Physical and structural violence is inherent in the highly competitive free-market system and its present laws of globalization, where specifically women were affected by the loss of human security.

In summary, the socialist utopia was destroyed by a repressive and bureaucratic communist regime. Which utopia is left to develop ethic principles, communitarian responsibility and environmentally sustainable development processes, in order to induce 'post-modern democracy of consensus', with equity, cultural diversity, real citizen representation, life quality and human, gender and environmental security (HUGE; Oswald 2001)?

The history of wars, domination, and destruction brought poverty and death. Will the emerging civilization guarantee diverse, just, equitable, and sustainable coexistence caring for the vulnerable? This is the challenge for peace researchers, educators and actors, and IPRA together with CLAIP has to reinvigorate its effort to find concrete answers to these new challenges.

Globalization from Below: Ecofeminist Alternatives to Corporate Globalization

Vandana Shiva

Introduction

Corporate globalization is a transfer of knowledge and natural resources, like seeds and water held, conserved, and used collectively by women for their communities, to global corporations. This transfer of wealth goes hand in hand with the transformation of nature, society, and women's status. Biodiversity and water are transformed from commons to commodities. Women, the creators of value, the providers of basic needs are turned into a dispensable sex. As women's rights to seed and water, their rights arising from providing food and water are eroded, women are devalued in society. When the sacred Ganga becomes a commodity, women, the water providers become dispensable. When agriculture is chemicalized and corporatized, women's work in agriculture is destroyed. As women are displaced from work, they not only loose their right to work, they also loose their right to live.

The practice of female feticide started in Punjab in the late 1970's as a consequence of the convergence of the commodification of agriculture, and with it the commodification of culture, women's displacement from productive roles in agriculture, and the rise of new technologies. In the last two decades female feticide has denied more than 10 million women their right to be born. Every year about 500,000 unborn girls are aborted.[1] India's population grew 21 per cent between 1991 and 2001 to 1.03 billion people. While the population grew, girls were disappearing. The change in sex ratio combined with population growth reveals there are 36 million fewer females in the population than would be expected. This is half the world's 60 million 'missing' women – those women who were not allowed to be born because of sex-selective abortion. And female feticide is most prevalent in rich, high growth areas like Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, and Gujarat. These are the areas where the culture of the market is the defining source of value. And in this marketplace women have no value but just a market price. In a market calculus it is cheaper to abort a female fetus than pay a dowry for a daughter.

The spread of dowry – used largely for purchasing consumer goods such as cars, televisions, and refrigerators – is contemporaneous and contiguous with the spread of the culture of consumerism. But women are not just victims of corporate globalization. They are also its strongest resistors and creators of alternatives.

Women's Rights to Knowledge and Biodiversity

Globalization and technological change is changing women's rights at two levels. Firstly, it is eroding women's rights to knowledge and creativity, to natural wealth like biodiversity and water. Women in India are the seed keepers and water keepers. They are also the keepers of traditional knowledge. The emergence of new forms of property as 'intellectual property' is allowing the piracy of centuries of traditional knowledge by global corporations. This in effect is a transfer of knowledge from women to corporations, and is an undermining of women's knowledge and creative rights. That is why I have spent the last decade fighting illegitimate forms of 'intellectual property' based on biopiracy as illustrated below in the three cases of *neem*, *basmati*, and wheat.

1 See: "10 million girls missing in India", in: *Asian Age*, 9 January 2006; "Female Feticide in India crossed 1 crore in 20 years", in: *Indian Express*, 9 January 2006.

On 8 March 2005, International Women's Day, we won a major victory in a biopiracy case after a 10-year legal battle in the European Patent Office. The United States Department of Agriculture and W.R. Grace jointly claimed to have 'invented' the use of the *neem tree* (*Azadirichta indica*) for controlling pests and diseases in agriculture. On the basis of this claim they were granted patent number 436257 by the European Patent Office.

Neem, or *azad darakht* to use its Persian name, which translates as free tree, has been used as a natural pesticide and medicine in India for over 2,000 years. As a response to the 1984 disaster at the Union Carbide's pesticide plant in Bhopal, I started a campaign with the slogan: "no more Bhopals, plant a *neem*." A decade later we found that because W.R. Grace was claiming to have invented the use of *neem*, the free tree was no longer going to be freely accessible to us. We launched a challenge to the *neem* biopiracy and more than 100,000 people joined the campaign. Another decade later, the European Patent Office revoked the patent.

Our success in defeating the claims of the US government and US corporations to traditional knowledge and biodiversity came because we combined research with action, and we mobilized and built movements at the local level. Three women working in global solidarity – Magda Aelvoet, former president of the Greens in the European Parliament; Linda Bullard, the president of the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM); and myself – saw the case through for over a decade without losing hope. Our lawyer, Dr. Dolder, a professor of intellectual property at Basel University, gave his best without expecting typical patent lawyer fees.

The *neem* victory throws light on one of the most pernicious aspects of the current rules of globalization – the WTO's *Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights* (TRIPS) agreement. TRIPS allows global corporations to patent anything and everything – life forms, seeds, plants, medicines, and traditional knowledge. Patents are supposed to satisfy three criteria: novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. 'Novelty' requires that the invention not be part of 'prior art' or existing knowledge; 'non-obviousness' requires that someone familiar in the art would not take the same step. Most patents based on the appropriation of indigenous knowledge violate these criteria, because they range from direct piracy to minor tinkering involving steps obvious to anyone trained in the techniques and disciplines involved. Since a patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention, patents on life and traditional knowledge are twice as harmful and add insult to injury. Such patents are not based on inventions; they serve as instruments for preventing the poor from satisfying their own needs and using their own biodiversity and their own knowledge.

Patents on seeds not only allow monopolies on genetically engineered seed, they allow patenting of traditional varieties and properties used by farmers over millennia. This biopiracy is illustrated in the cases of rice and wheat.

Basmati Biopiracy

The Indian subcontinent is the biggest producer and exporter of superfine aromatic rice: *basmati*. India grows 650,000 tons of basmati annually. Basmati covers 10 to 15 per cent of the land area under rice cultivation in India. Basmati and non-basmati rice are exported to more than 80 countries across the world. Basmati exports were 488,700 tons and amounted to US $ 280 million. Non-basmati rice exports in 1996–1997 were 1.9 million tons and amounted to US $ 450 million. The main importers of Indian basmati are the Middle East (65 per cent), Europe (20 per cent) and the US (10 to 15 per cent). Fetching US $ 850 a ton in the European Union (EU) compared with US $ 700 a ton for Pakistani basmati and US $ 500 a ton for Thai fragrant rice. Indian basmati is the most expensive rice being imported by the EU. Basmati has been grown for centuries on the subcontinent, as is evident from ancient texts, folklore, and poetry. One of the earliest references to basmati is made in the famous epic of *Heer Ranjha*, written by the poet Varis Shah in 1766. This naturally perfumed variety of rice has been treasured and possessively guarded by nobles, and eagerly coveted by foreigners. It has evolved over centuries of observation, experimentation, and selection by farmers who have developed numerous varieties of the rice to meet various ecological conditions, cooking needs, and tastes. There are 27 documented varieties of basmati grown in India. The superior qualities of basmati must predominantly be attributed to the contributions of the subcontinent's farmers.

On 2 September 1997, Texas-based RiceTec was granted patent number 5663484 on basmati rice lines and grains. The patent of this 'invention' is exceptionally broad and includes 20 claims within it. The patent covered the genetic lines of basmati and includes genes from the varieties developed by farmers. It thus automatically covered farmers' varieties and allowed

RiceTec to collect royalties from farmers growing varieties developed by them and their forefathers.

RiceTec's strain, trading under brand names such as Kasmati, Texmati, and Jasmati, possess the same qualities – long grain, distinct aroma, high-yield, and semi-dwarf – as our traditional Indian varieties. RiceTec is essentially derived from basmati; it cannot be claimed as 'novel' and therefore should not be patentable. Through a four-year-long campaign, we overturned most of RiceTec's patent claims to basmati.

Wheat Biopiracy

Monsanto's biopiracy of Indian wheat forms an integral part of the life of most Indians. It has been the principal crop in several regions of India for thousands of years. India is the second-largest producer of wheat (73.5 million tons) after China. Twenty-five million hectares of wheat are cultivated in India. In addition to being the staple food of most Indians, wheat is closely associated with religious ceremonies and festivals. Each traditional variety has its own religious or cultural significance. The different varieties of wheat, the use of different wheat preparations in rituals, and the medicinal and therapeutic properties of wheat have all been documented in ancient Indian texts and scriptures.

Monsanto's patent registered with the European Patent Office claims to have 'invented' wheat plants derived from a traditional Indian variety and products made from the soft milling traits that the traditional Indian wheat provides. Monsanto's patent claims its plants were derived from varieties of traditional Indian wheat called Nap Hal. There is no traditional Indian wheat called Nap Hal. In Hindi the word would mean 'that which gives no fruit' and could be a name for Monsanto's terminator seeds. 'Nap Hal' is evidently a distortion of 'Nepal', since the wheat varieties were collected from near the Nepal border.

In February 2004, the Research Foundation and Greenpeace filed a legal challenge against Monsanto's biopiracy. By September 2004, Monsanto's patent had been revoked. These victories do not mean our work is over. Corporations continue to patent life forms and pirate traditional knowledge. They also continue to impose unjust and immoral seed and patent laws on countries. Parallel to the struggle to defend women's rights to biodiversity and knowledge is the struggle to defend the women's right to water.

Women's Right to Water

Women in a small hamlet in Kerala succeeded in shutting down a *Coca-Cola* plant. "When you drink Coke, you drink the blood of people," said Mylamma, the woman who started the movement against Coca-Cola in Plachimada. The Coca-Cola plant in Plachimada was commissioned in March 2000 to produce 1,224,000 bottles of Coca-Cola products a day and issued a conditional license to install a motor-driven water pump by the *panchayat*. However, the company started to illegally extract millions of litres of clean water. According to the local people, Coca-Cola was extracting 1.5 million litres per day. The water level started to fall, dropping from 150 to 500 feet below the earth's surface. Tribals and farmers complained that water storage and supply were being adversely affected by indiscriminate installation of bore wells for tapping groundwater, resulting in serious consequences for crop cultivation. The wells were also threatening traditional drinking-water sources, ponds and water tanks, waterways and canals. When the company failed to comply with the panchayat request for details, a show cause notice was served and the license was cancelled. Coca-Cola unsuccessfully tried to bribe the panchayat president A. Krishnan, with 300 million rupees.

Not only did Coca-Cola steal the water of the local community, it also polluted what it didn't take. The company deposited waste material outside the plant which, during the rainy season, spread into paddy fields, canals, and wells, causing serious health hazards. As a result of this dumping, 260 bore wells provided by public authorities for drinking water and agriculture facilities have become dry. Coca-Cola was also pumping wastewater into dry bore wells within the company premises. In 2003, the district medical officer informed the people of Plachimada that their water was unfit for drinking. The women, who already knew their water was toxic, had to walk miles to get water. Coca-Cola had created water scarcity in a water-abundant region.

The women of Plachimada were not going to allow this hydropiracy. In 2002 they started a *dharna* (sit-in) at the gates of Coca-Cola. To celebrate one year of their agitation, I joined them on Earth Day 2003. On 21 September 2003, a huge rally delivered an ultimatum to Coca-Cola. And in January 2004, a World Water Conference brought global activists like Jose Bové and Maude Barlow to Plachimada to support the local activists. A movement started by local

adivasi women had unleashed a national and global wave of people's energy in their support.

The local panchayat used its constitutional rights to serve notice to Coca-Cola. The Perumatty panchayat also filed public interest litigation in the Kerala High Court against Coca- Cola. The court supported the women's demands and, in an order given on 16 December 2003, Justice Balakrishnana Nair ordered Coca-Cola to stop pirating Plachimada's water. Justice Nair's decision stated:

> The public trust doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters, and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of their status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purpose. Our legal system – based on English common law – includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources, which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the seashore, running waters, airs, forests, and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.

On 17 February 2004, the Kerala chief minister, under pressure from the growing movement and a drought-aggravated water crisis, ordered the closure of the Coca-Cola plant. The victory of the movement in Plachimada was the result of creating broad alliances and using multiple strategies. The local movement of women in Plachimada triggered recognition of people's community rights to water in law, while also triggering movements against the 87 other Coca-Cola and Pepsi plants where water is being depleted and polluted.

Plachimada Declaration

> Water is the basis of life; it is the gift of nature; it belongs to all living beings on earth.
>
> Water is not private property. It is a common resource for the sustenance of all.
>
> Water is the fundamental human right. It has to be conserved, protected, and managed. It is our fundamental obligation to prevent water scarcity and pollution and to preserve it for generations.
>
> Water is not a commodity. We should resist all criminal attempts to marketize, privatize, and corporatize water. Only through these means can we ensure the fundamental and inalienable right to water for people all over the world.
>
> The water policy should be formulated on the basis of this outlook.
>
> The right to conserve, use, and manage water is fully vested with the local community. This is the very basis of water democracy. Any attempt to reduce or deny this right is a crime.
>
> The production and marketing of the poisonous products of the Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola corporations lead to total destruction and pollution and also endangers the very existence of local communities.
>
> The resistance that has come up in Plachimada, Puduchery, and in various parts of the world is the symbol of our valiant struggle against the devilish corporate gangs who pirate our water.
>
> We, who are in the battlefield in full solidarity with the adivasis who have put up resistance against the tortures of the horrid commercial forces in Plachimada, exhort the people all over the world to boycott the products of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola.

Plachimada created new energy for local resistance everywhere. In May 2004, groups from across India fighting against water mining met in Delhi to coordinate their actions as the *Coca Cola Pepsi Quit India Campaign*.

Commodification of Our Rivers

Delhi, India's capital has been sustained for centuries by the river Yamuna. The 16th century poet Sant Vallabhacharya wrote the *Yamunastakam* in praise of the Yamuna.

> *I bow joyfully to Yamuna, the source of all spiritual abilities.*
>
> *You are richly endowed with innumerable sands glistening from contact with lotus-feet of Krishna.*
>
> *Your water is delightfully scented with fragrant flowers from the fresh flowers from the fresh forests that flourish on your banks.*
>
> *You bear the beauty of Krishna, Cupid's father, who is worshipped by both the gods and demons.*
>
> *You rush down from Kalinda Mountain, your waters bright with white foam.*
>
> *Anxious for love you gush onward, rising and falling through the boulders.*

Your excited, undulating motions create melodious songs, and it appears that you are mounted on a swaying palanquin of love.

Glory be to Yamuna, daughter of the sun, who increases love for Krishna.

You have descended to purify the earth.

Parrots, peacocks, swans, and other birds serve you with their various sons, as if they were your dear friends.

Your waves appear as braceleted arms, and your banks as beautiful hips decorated with sands that look like pearl-studded ornaments.

I bow to you, fourth beloved of Krishna.

You are adorned with countless qualities, and are praised by Siva, Brahma, and other gods.

Two decades of industrialization have turned the Yamuna into a toxic sewer. Instead of stopping the pollution, the World Bank, using the scarcity created by the pollution, pushed the Delhi government to privatize Delhi's water supply and get water from the Tehri Dam on the Ganges, hundreds of miles away. A privatized plant that could have been built for 1 billion rupees has cost the public 7 billion rupees.

The privatization of Delhi's water supply is cantered around the Sonia Vihar water treatment plant. The plant, which was inaugurated on 21 June 2002, is designed at a cost of 1.8 billion rupees for a capacity of 635 million litres a day on a 10-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) basis. The contract between Delhi Jal Board and the French company *Ondeo Degremont* (a subsidiary of the *Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux* Water Division – the water giant of the world), is supposed to provide safe drinking water for the city.

The water for the Suez-Degremont plant in Delhi will come from the Tehri Dam through the Upper Ganga Canal to Muradnagar in Western Uttar Pradesh and then through a giant pipeline to Delhi. The Upper Ganga Canal, which starts at Haridwar and carries the holy water of the Ganga to Kanpur via Muradnagar, is the main source of irrigation for this region.

Suez is not bringing in private foreign investment. It is appropriating public investment. Public-private partnerships are, in effect, private appropriation of public investment. But the financial costs are not the highest costs. The real costs are social and ecological. The Ganga is also being transformed from a river of life to a river of death by the ecological consequences of damming and diversion. The Tehri Dam, located in the outer Himalaya, in the Tehri-Garhwal district of Uttaranchal, is planned to be the fifth highest dam in the world. If completed, it will be 260.5 metres high and create a lake spread over an area of 45 square kilometres of land in the Bhagirathi and Bhilangana valleys. The dam will submerge 4,200 hectares of the most fertile flat land in those valleys without benefiting the region in any way.

Additionally, the area is earthquake prone and the huge Tehri Dam is located in a seismic fault zone. Between 1816 and 1991, there have been 17 earthquakes in the Garhwal region, with recent ones occurring in Uttarkashi in 1991 and Chamoli in 1998. The International Commission on Large Dams has declared the dam site "extremely hazardous."

If the dam collapses from an earthquake – or from any other fault, such as a landslide – the devastation will be unimaginable. The huge reservoir will be emptied in 22 minutes. Within an hour Rishikesh will be under 260 metres of water. Within the next 23 minutes Haridwar will be submerged under 232 metres of water. Bijnor, Meerut, Hapur, and Bulandshahar will be under water within 12 hours. The dam is potentially dangerous for large parts of North-western India, and large areas in the Gangetic Plain could be devastated.

Delhi's ever growing water demands have already led to major diversions of water from other regions. Delhi already gets 455 million litres from the Ganga. With the Sonia Vihar plant's demand for 635 million litres, 1,090 million litres per day are diverted from the Ganga. Further diversions of three billion cubic metres per second from the Ganga are built into the Sharda and Yamuna river link. Delhi is also demanding 180 million litres per day to be diverted from Punjab's Dhakra Dam. Water will also be diverted to Delhi from the Renuka Dam on the Giri River (1,250 million cubic litres per day) and Keshau Dam on the Tons River (610 million cubic litres per day). These diversions will have huge ecological and social costs. On 13 June 2005, five farmers were shot while protesting the diversion of water from Bisalpur dam for Jaipur city through an Asian Development Bank project. The mega diversion for water waste by the rich in Delhi could trigger major 'water conflicts'.

Building water democracy means building alliances. When advertisement for the inauguration of Suez's Sonia Vihar plant appeared on 2 June 2002, I started to contact citizens groups in Delhi and people's movements along the Ganges. Each group helped frame the struggle against privatization and everyone's issue became a key to resistance. The 100,000 people displaced by Tehri Dam were linked to the millions of Indians who hold the Ganges as sa-

cred, who, in turn, were connected to farmers whose land and water would be appropriated. Millions signed petitions saying, "Our Mother Ganga is not for sale." We organized a Jal Swaraj Yatra (a water democracy journey) from 15 to 22 March, World Water Day. We did Ganga Yatras to rejuvenate the living culture of the sacred Ganges. A million people were reached; 150,000 signed a hundred-metre 'river' of cloth to protest privatization.

The government of Uttaranchal (where the Tehri Dam is located) and the government of Uttar Pradesh (from where the water was to be diverted) refused to supply water to the Suez plant in Delhi. We do not need privatization or river diversions to address Delhi's water problems. We have shown how with equitable distribution and a combination of conservation, recycling, and reduction in use, Delhi's water needs can be met locally. We need democracy and conservation. The seeds for the water democracy movement in Delhi have been sown. We now have to nurture them to reclaim water as a commons and a public good. When Paul Wolfowitz visited India as the President of World Bank, women were there to tell him and the World Bank to keep their hands off our water.

As we defend our seed and knowledge, our food and water, we are shaping another world – a world centred on women and nature, a world sustaining the life of all beings.

Towards a Human Security Perspective for the Mediterranean

Narcís Serra

The Mediterranean presents many challenges in terms of security, as it is a focus for many of the political, economic, and social tensions that can also be found on a global scale. Thus in 1995, the leaders of European and Mediterranean countries decided to launch the Barcelona Process with the aim of working together to build an area of peace, shared prosperity, and human exchange. Today, these objectives are still unresolved issues. European and Mediterranean actors will have to continue in their efforts to reach this goal, at the same time as updating these objectives and making use of any new instruments that become available. In terms of security, for example, the Mediterranean cannot be excluded from the growing interest in the concept of human security.

The 'human security' concept was first used in the 1994 UNDP report on human development. Since then there has been a growing consensus that in a world in which both the concept of threat and the nature of armed conflict have undergone significant transformation, it is the individual citizen who should be made the main object of protection. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, challenges in the area of international security have gone from focusing on purely military-based protection of the interests of the state and its territory to a concept based on the need to guarantee people's security through what is commonly expressed as 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. The doctrine of human security, therefore, has widened the traditional debate in this field, a debate that has been dominated since the Second World War (and particularly during the Cold War) by the doctrine of national security. It was in the mid-20th century that international security assumed a distinctly political and military nature, since attacks from other countries had become the main threat to state sovereignty and the international order. Now, in contrast, the greatest threats come from failed states that have become mired in 'new wars' in which the civilian population ends up as the main victim of any armed conflict. It is these threats, together with those of international terrorism, human rights abuses, extreme poverty, and infectious diseases that now represent the main challenges to the well-being of individual citizens.

The *European Security Strategy* (ESS), adopted by the European Council in December 2003, is one of the best examples of the transformation of security challenges that the European Union has had to face at the dawn of the 21st century. In the words of the Council document, "Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable." These threats include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, the breakdown of the state, and organized crime. At the same time, none of these threats is of a solely military nature, nor can they be countered by using only military instruments. In this respect, the Strategy entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World* advises facing up to these threats in the knowledge that "the first line of defence will often be abroad", at the same time as calling for the creation of security in neighbouring countries and for the reinforcement of effective multilateralism as the framework of the international order.

In September 2004, a group of academics, diplomats, and experts headed by Mary Kaldor, a professor from the London School of Economics, presented a report to Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was entitled *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*. In this report, the *Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities* proposes that human security should be consolidated as the narrative strategy of the Union's foreign policy, thus granting it with the necessary ca-

pabilities. In this way, emphasis is placed upon the void that exists between the real needs in the area of security and the capabilities currently available (which basically consist of armed forces designed to fight against foreign armies and to safeguard state borders). By adopting a human security doctrine, the European Union will be contributing to the creation of a more secure global order, in the full knowledge that "Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity," as the report states.

In order to implement the *European Security Strategy* in the direction proposed, the document "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe" establishes five key principles with which all human security operations should comply. The first of these states the primacy of human rights, thus echoing the proposals of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report *The Responsibility to Protect*, published in December 2001. The second principle is the establishment of a clear political authority. The third espouses multilateralism, or giving priority to the international legal order. The bottom-up approach that is to say, taking action while bearing in mind the needs of the local population, is the fourth principle for human security operations. Finally, the last principle refers to the need to adopt a regional focus when dealing with crisis.

The report also proposes the creation of a "Human Security Response Force" made up of 15,000 men and women, of whom one third would be civilians, in addition to establishing a new legal framework which would decide when intervention should take place, as well as coordinating operations on the ground.

Shortly after the publication of this document, the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs published a report on the European Security Strategy, presented by the MEP Helmut Kuhne. The report acknowledges the importance of the civil-military missions proposed by the *Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities* within the framework of the ESDP, as well as the introduction of a civilian component into the Human Security Response Force, called the "Human Security Volunteer Service". In the light of the content of the Kuhne report, many points of contact exist between the *European Security Strategy* and the document *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, especially in terms of the ability of the human security doctrine to implement the European Security Strategy.

At this point, it remains to be seen whether, in the Mediterranean region, the 2003 Strategy succeeds in incorporating an approach that complies with the principles of human security. As this document acknowledges, the Mediterranean is a key region in terms of the Union's external relations. Europe's commitment to its neighbouring regions (Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries) is one of the Union's strategic components in its attempts to guarantee its security and that of its neighbouring countries. In the words of the Strategy, "the European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process."

Nevertheless, in spite of the Mediterranean's importance for European security, and also despite the existence of a political and security dimension in the framework of the Barcelona Process, advances made in recent years have been few. By way of illustration, conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli, the situation in the Western Sahara, and the division of Cyprus are all still unresolved. Unfortunately, it cannot be claimed that the Mediterranean is a more secure place for its states and citizens in 2007 than it was in 1995.

In fact, in recent years, even greater emphasis has been placed on the need to advance through cooperation with respect to security in the Mediterranean, and by incorporating the approach of human security. In the Near East, in spite of the positive signals produced following Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, the Israeli position hardened in 2006, culminating in the war with Lebanon that summer. Three members of the Barcelona Process (Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon) were plunged into a military escalation which clearly showed that the possibility of achieving one of the objectives laid down in the Barcelona Declaration, to create an area of peace in the Mediterranean, was long way off. The situation also highlighted the fact that in the event of a military escalation as the one in the Near East, it was not only the security of the state that was endangered, but also and particularly that of its citizens. The conflict in Lebanon, by which we refer both to the Israeli attack in July 2006 and the later struggle between the Lebanese army and the terrorist networks in the Naher el Bared Palestinian refugee camp, demonstrates that it is always the civilian population that suffers most from such a climate of insecurity. At the same time, the situation of insecurity in the region has meant that progress with discussions promoted by the Barcelona Process on the subject of security has been hampered. This is why it has become vitally important to break this vicious circle. But that can only be achieved

through large doses of political determination and leadership and, within this context, discussions on points directly linked to human security (such as the protection of civilians and mine clearance) might represent a good opportunity to recommence the dialogue on security.

In the Maghreb region, threats to the security of citizens and states are increasingly related to the proliferation of terrorist networks. The 2007 attacks in Morocco and Algeria raised fears of a fresh outbreak of violence in the western Mediterranean basin, and recalled the nightmare situation experienced by Algeria in the first half of the 1990's; but what is even worse, they showed how the terrorist methods used in Iraq and Afghanistan were being increasingly imported into the region. These events highlighted the need to increase cooperation in the area of security between the north and south of the Mediterranean, as well as between the southern countries themselves. Having said that, it should be borne in mind that the objective of such cooperation is not only to maintain the stability of the state, but also to safeguard the lives of citizens. As a consequence (and in accordance with agreements made at the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona), such cooperation should never be carried out at the expense of respect for human rights or the fundamental freedoms of European and Mediterranean citizens.

In view of this context, the EU and its Mediterranean partners will have to redouble their efforts in order to move forward towards a shared security agenda that incorporates the protection of citizens as one of its main priorities. This should be undertaken in a transversal manner, within the framework of the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the bilateral relations that exist between EU member states and their Mediterranean partners.

To this end, there are three points that should be given particular consideration, both at a political and an academic level. The first is the problem of coherence and consistency. For a number of years the Barcelona Process has coexisted alongside the European Neighbourhood Policy, and yet neither the European nor the Mediterranean partners have managed to arrive at a clear conclusion on the subject of 'who does what' or, more to the point, 'who is better prepared to do what'. Thus some serious thought should be given as to which of these frameworks (not to mention the criteria used to decide on the division of labour) will produce the best results in terms of promoting a human security agenda in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, care should be taken to avoid a situation in which contradictions exist between the two agendas in the area of security, or any unnecessary overlap of responsibilities. Finally, it should be stressed that the main challenge in terms of coordinating the agendas of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy is for the EU to adopt a common foreign policy. At this point in time, close attention should be paid to developments in the current constitutional crisis, to see whether the solution of the simplified Treaty (which is expected to be debated by the European Council in June 2007) will lead to the creation of the post of Foreign Affairs Minister, thereby providing Europe with a necessary (albeit still insufficient) instrument for establishing a true common foreign and security policy.

The second idea derives from observing one of the aforementioned conflicts: Lebanon. The Lebanese crisis in the summer of 2006 highlighted, once again, Europe's shortcomings in terms of coordination and shared vision. The EU has begun to compensate for this deficiency with its determined involvement in the pacification and progress in the region through the deployment of troops by countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, as part of the new UN mission. Nevertheless, time will demonstrate (and in fact, it is already doing so) that an exclusively military approach has little chance of achieving the desired results. Missions of a civilian nature and those military missions in which civilians play a greater role might help to guarantee not only state security in Lebanon, but also more effective protection of its citizens' rights.

The third point for consideration is linked to a subject that is awakening increasing interest in works on European integration: strengthened cooperation. Following the successive enlargements of the EU, and the growing plurality of the states of which it is comprised, it has become clear that the only way to move forward is through strengthened cooperation initiatives. This means that a group of states could opt to embark on such a cooperation project without all the states having to join them, though they would leave the door open for any other country to sign up to the initiative. This may prove to be the most effective strategy for moving ahead towards a Mediterranean human security agenda, given that neither all the EU states nor all their Euro-Mediterranean partners will be as keen (or as reluctant) to agree on policies in this field. Strengthened cooperation can bring about gradual but constant advances in aspects that have been neglected until now (such as the security sector reform), or in issues that have not been sufficiently ex-

plored (such as protection of civilians and mine clearance). The establishment of pilot schemes that would enable us to go into the dialogue on security in greater depth could represent a decisive show of determination to create a human security doctrine for the Mediterranean.

Finally, and by way of conclusion, it must be stressed that the *European Security Strategy* adopted in December 2003 does not impose human security, but rather it accepts or enables it. The doctrine of human security facilitates an implementation that is best suited to the Strategy's principles and, in this sense, the Mediterranean represents the greatest challenge for the ESDP. This is the main region that demands action from the EU, action that could facilitate the definition and application of Europe's role in foreign policy. Furthermore, the Mediterranean is the field in which the principles of human security promise to be most effective, especially given the fact that a large proportion of the security challenges in this region involve the protection of the human rights of its population.

1 Introduction: Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century

Hans Günter Brauch

1.1 Introductory Remark

This book focuses on the *reconceptualization of security in the 21st century* that has gradually evolved since the end of the East-West conflict (1989–1991) and that has been significantly influenced by processes of globalization and global environmental change.

This global turn has resulted in the end of the Cold War (1946–1989), which some historians have interpreted as a 'long peace' (Gaddis 1987, 1997) with a highly armed bipolar international order, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and of a competitive global ideology, system of rule and military superpower. These events brought about a fundamental and peaceful change in international order that made the reunification of Germany (1990) and of Europe with the Eastern enlargement of the EU (2004, 2007) possible.

This turn has been portrayed either as a 'victory' of US superiority (Schweitzer 1994) or as an outcome of a 'political learning' (Grunberg/Risse-Kappen 1992) based on a new thinking ('*Perestroika*') of Gorbachev that contributed to the first major peaceful global change in modern history. This 'global turn' (1989–1991) has been the fourth major change since the French Revolution that was instrumental for the emergence of a new international order. Three previous turning points in modern history were the result of revolutions (1789, 1911–1918) and of wars (1796–1815, 1914–1918, 1931–1949) resulting in a systemic transformation.

This fourth peaceful turn triggered a peaceful (Czechoslovakia) and violent disintegration of multiethnic states (USSR, Yugoslavia); it contributed to the emergence of 'failing' states (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan) and to 'new wars' (Kaldor/Vashee 1997; Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002, 2005). Besides the events in Europe during 1989, events in other parts of the world had no similar impact on the new global (dis)order during the 1990's, e.g. the death of Mao Zedong (1976) and the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in China (1978–1990); the end of the dictatorships and the third wave of democratization in Latin America; and the many new wars in Africa due to weak, failing or failed states where warlords took over control in parts of West (Liberia) and Eastern Africa (Somalia), as well as in Asia (Afghanistan).

This chapter aims at a mental mapping of the complex interaction between this most recent global structural change and conceptual innovation that have occurred in academia, in international organizations as well as in the declarations and statements of governments since 1990 up to spring 2007. It refers only briefly to the term and concept of security (1.2, see for details chapters 3–9 in this volume), to the contextual context: events, structures, concepts and action (1.3), to the theme of contextual change, conceptual innovation as tools for knowledge creation and action (1.4), to the drivers and centres of conceptual innovation (1.5), to four scientific disciplines: history, philosophy, social sciences, and international law (1.6), to the *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* and to the goal of the three related volumes (1.7), to the goals, structure, authors, and audience of this book (1.8) as well as to the expected audience of this book (1.9).

1.2 Object: Term and Concept of Security.

Security is a basic *term* and a key *concept* in the social sciences that is used in intellectual traditions and schools, conceptual frameworks, and approaches. The term 'security' is associated with many different meanings that refer to frameworks and dimensions, apply to individuals, issue areas, societal conventions, and changing historical conditions and circumstances. Thus, security as an individual or societal political value has no independent meaning and is always related

Table 1.1: Vertical Levels and Horizontal Dimensions of Security in North and South

Security dimension ⇒ Level of interaction ⇓ *(referent objects)*	Military	Political	Economic	Environmental ↓	Social
Human ➔			Social, energy, food , health, livelihood threats, challenges and risks may pose a *survival dilemma* in areas with high vulnerability		
Village/Community/Society				↓↑	
National	"Security dilemma of competing states" (*National Security Concept*)		"Securing energy, food, health, livelihood etc." (*Human Security Concept*) combining all levels of analysis & interaction		
International/Regional				↓↑	
Global/Planetary ➔					

to a context and a specific individual or societal value system and its realization (see chap. 4 by Brauch).

Security is a societal value or symbol (Kaufmann 1970, 1973) that is used in relation to protection, lack of risks, certainty, reliability, trust and confidence, predictability in contrast with danger, risk, disorder and fear. As a social science concept, "*security* is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning" (Art 1993: 821). Arnold Wolfers (1962: 150) pointed to two sides of the security concept: "Security, in an *objective* sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a *subjective* sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."

For the constructivists, security is *intersubjective* referring to "what actors make of it" (Wendt 1992, 1999). Thus, security depends on a normative core that can not simply be taken for granted. Political constructions of security have real world effects, because they guide action of policymakers, thereby exerting constitutive effects on political order (see chap. 4 by Wæver, 37 by Baylis, 51 by Hintermeier in this vol.). The 'security concept' has gradually widened since the 1980's (Krell 1981; Jahn/Lemaitre/Wæver 1987; Wæver/Lemaitre/Tromer 1989; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1995, 1998; Wæver/Buzan/de Wilde 2008; chap. 38 by Albrecht/Brauch). For Wæver (1997, chap. 4 and 44) security is the result of a speech act ('securitization'), according to which an issue is treated as: "an existential threat to a valued referent object" to allow "urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat". Thus, the "securitizing actor" points "to an existential threat" and thereby legitimizes "extraordinary measures".

'Security in an objective sense' refers to specific *security dangers*, i.e. to 'threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks' (Brauch 2003, 2005, 2005a) to specific *security dimensions* (political, military, economic, societal, environmental) and *referent objectives* (international, national, human) as well as *sectors* (social, energy, food, water), while 'security in a subjective sense' refers to *security concern*s that are expressed by government officials, media representatives, scientists or 'the people' in a speech act or in written statements (historical sources) by those who securitize 'dangers' as security 'concerns' being existential for the survival of the referent object and that require and legitimize extraordinary measures and means to face and cope with these concerns. Thus, *security concepts* have always been the product of orally articulated or written statements by those who use them as tools to analyse, interpret, and assess past actions or to request or legitimize present or future activities in meeting the specified security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks.

The Copenhagen School (Buzan/Wæver 1997; Wæver 1997; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998; Wæver/Buzan/de Wilde 2008), distinguished among five dimensions (*widening*: military, political, economic, societal and environmental), and five referent objects ('whose security') or levels of interaction or analysis (*deepening*: international, regional, national, domestic groups, individual). They did not review the *sectorialization* of security from the perspective of *national* (international, regional) and *human security* (Brauch 2003, 2005, 2005a; table 1.1).

Influenced by different worldviews, rival theories and mindsets, security is a key concept of competing schools of a) *war, strategic* or *security studies* from a realist perspective, and b) *peace and conflict research* from an idealist or pragmatic view (chap. 40 by Albrecht/Brauch). Since 1990, interparadigm debates emerged between traditional, critical, and constructivist approaches. Within the UN and NATO, different concepts coexist, a state-centred political and

Table 1.2: Expanded Concepts of Security (Møller 2001, 2003; Oswald 2001, 2007)

Concepts of security	Reference object (security of whom?)	Value at risk (security of what?)	Source(s) of threat (security from whom/ what?)
National Security [political, military dimension]	The state	Sovereignty, territorial integrity	Other states, guerilla, terrorism (substate actors)
Societal security [dimension]	Nations, societal groups	National unity, identity	(States) Nations, migrants, alien cultures
Human security	Individuals, humankind	Survival, quality of life	State, globalization, GEC, nature, terrorism
Environmental security [dimension]	Ecosystem	Sustainability	Humankind
Gender security	Gender relations, indigenous people, minorities, children, elders	Equality, equity, identity, solidarity, social representations	Patriarchy, totalitarian institutions (governments, religions, elites, culture), intolerance, violence

military concept, and an extended security concept with economic, societal, and environmental dimensions. A widening and deepening of the security concept prevailed in OECD countries, while other countries adhered to a narrow military concept

Not only the scope of '*securitization*' (Wæver 1997, 1997a) has changed, but also the referent object from a 'national' to a 'human-centred' security concept, both within the UN system (UNDP 1994; UNESCO 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003; UNU 2002; UNU-EHS 2004), and in the academic security community.

In European security discourses, an 'extended' security concept is used by governments and in scientific debates (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998). Møller (2001, 2003) distinguished a 'national' and three expanded security concepts of 'societal, human, and environmental security'. Oswald (2001, 2007, 2008) introduced a combined 'human, gender and environmental' (HUGE) security concept (table 1.2).

While since the 19th century the key 'actor' has been the state, it has not necessarily been a major 'referent object' of security which is often referred to as 'the people' or 'our people' whose survival is at stake (Brauch chap. 3; Albrecht/Brauch chap. 38). From 1947 to 1989 national and military security issues became a matter of means (armaments), instruments (intelligence) and strategies (deterrence). Wæver (1995: 45) argued that environmental issues may pose threats of violent conflicts and that they may also put the survival of the people at stake (e.g. by forced migration) without a threat of war.

Whether a threat, challenge, vulnerability, and risk (Brauch 2005a, 2006) becomes an 'objective security danger' or a 'subjective security concern' also depends on the political context. While in Europe climate change has become a major security issue, in the US, during the administration of George W. Bush this problem was downgraded. Labelling climate change a security issue implies different degrees of urgency and means for coping with it.

The traditional understanding of security "as the absence of existential threats to the state emerging from another state" (Müller 2002: 369) has been challenged both with regard to the key subject (the state) and carrier of security needs, and its exclusive focus on the "physical – or political – dimension of security of territorial entities" that are behind the suggestions for a horizontal and vertical widening of the security concept.

The meaning of security was also interpreted as a reaction to globalization and to global environmental change. In Europe, several critical approaches to security gradually evolved as the *Aberystwyth* (Booth, Wyn Jones, William), *Paris* (Bigo, Badie) and *Copenhagen* (Wiberg, Wæver, Møller) schools that led to the development of a *New European Security Theory* (NEST, e.g. Bürger/Stritzel 2005) and a 'networked manifesto' (CASE 2006; chap. 38 by Albrecht/Brauch).

1.3 Events – Structures – Concepts – Action

Political and scientific concepts, like security, are used within a complex context (Koselleck 2006). These concepts have a temporal and systematic structure, they embody and reflect the time when they were used and they are thus historical documents in the

persistent change in the history of short events (*histoire des événements*) and long structures (Braudel's (1949, 1969, 1972) *histoire de la longue durée*). Concepts are influenced by manifold perceptions and interpretations of events that only rarely change the basic structures of international politics and of international relations (IR).

The political events of 1989, the rare coincidence of a reform effort from the top and a yearning for freedom and democracy from the bottom, as part of a peaceful upheaval in East Central Europe toppled the Communist governments in all East Central European countries within three months, and thus were instrumental for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Comecon (1991).

The Cold War bipolar order of two rival highly armed political systems with the capability to destroy the globe with its weapons of mass destruction based on nuclear deterrence doctrines became obsolete as well as the traditional security legitimizations with the arms of the other side. This structural change of the international order influenced the security policy agendas and provoked a global political and scientific debate on the reconceptualization of security. This debate has been global, stimulated by many policy actors, scientists and intellectuals. The results of this process are documented in the national security doctrines and strategies (e.g. in the US) and in defence white papers of many countries (e.g. in Germany 1994, 2006). They have also been an object of analysis of the scientific community that gradually emancipated itself from the US conceptual dominance (Wæver 2004; Wæver/Buzan 2006). But these Northern discourses on security have been unaware and ignored the thinking of the philosophical traditions in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and in the Arab world.

While Huntington in his 'clash of civilization' (1993, 1996) succeeded to 'securitize culture' from the vantage point of US national security interests and strategies, the critical responses (Said; Chomsky; Ajami) reflected the cultural and religious diversity of the other five billion people that have been primarily an object of security thinking and policy during and after the Cold War.

This reconceptualization of security has impacts on international agendas and thus on political action on many different levels. UNDP (1994) introduced a 'people-centred' human security concept that was subsequently promoted by the *Human Security Network* (as 'freedom from fear'), and by the *Human Security Commission* (as 'freedom from want'), to which Kofi Annan added as a third pillar: 'freedom to live in dignity' and the *United Nations University* (UNU) as the fourth pillar: 'freedom from hazard impact' (Bogardi/Brauch 2005; Brauch 2005, 2005a).

An effort of the only remaining superpower to regain control over the security discourse in its 'war on terror' by trying to politically adapt scientific evidence on climate change and to constrain scientific freedom has failed. Other efforts by a leading neo-conservative think tank to pay scientists a fee for challenging the fourth IPCC Report (2007) to downgrade and thus to de-securitize these new dangers posed by anthropogenic climate change may also fail.[1]

The increasing perception of global environmental change (GEC) as a 'threat' to the survival of humankind and the domestic backlash in the US against the narrow security concepts and policies of the Neocons has widely established a widened, deepened, and sectorialized security concept that increasingly reflects the existing cultural and religious diversity also in the political debate on security as well as in scientific discourses. In this context, this volume has a dual function: a) to map this global conceptual change; and b) to create a wide scientific and political awareness of the new threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks that often differ from the perception of the present political elite in the only remaining superpower.

Thus, conceptualizing security concepts and defining the manifold security interests and preferences, structures the public policy discourse and legitimates the allocation of scarce financial resources to 'face' and 'cope' with major security dangers and concerns that threaten the survival of states, human beings or humankind and thus require 'extraordinary' political action.

1.4 Contextual Change, Conceptual Innovation as Tools for Knowledge Creation and Action

A key analytical question to which all authors were invited to reflect is to which extent the structural change in the global and regional international order

1 See: Ian Sample: "Scientists offered cash to dispute climate study", in: *The Guardian*, 2 February 2007; Elisabeth Rosenthal; Andrew C. Revkin: "Science Panel Calls Global Warming 'Unequivocal'", in: *The New York Times*, 3 February 2007; Juliet Eilperin: "Humans Faulted For Global Warming International Panel Of Scientists Sounds Dire Alarm", in: *Washington Post*, 3 February 2007.

was instrumental, triggered or contributed to this conceptual innovation and diversity in the global security discourse since 1990 or to which extent other events or regional or national structural changes have initiated a conceptual rethinking.

From the perspective of this author, major changes in the international order for the past 500 years have been:

- The *Hispanic World Order*: Expulsion of the Arabs and conquest of the Americas (1492–1618) by Spain and Portugal that resulted in a global order dominated by the Christian 'civilized world' that perceived the South as 'primitive barbarians';
- The *peace of Münster and Osnabrück* (1648) after the religious Thirty Years War (1618–1648), and the emergence of the Westphalian European order based on territorial states and an emerging international law;
- The *Utrecht Settlement* and the century of war and peace in the order of Christian princes (1715–1814).

After the independence of the United States (1776), the French Revolution (1789), and the wars of liberation in Latin America (1809–1824) and the emergence of many new independent states (1817–1839) in Europe four major international orders and major global structural and contextual changes can be distinguished:

- The *Peace Settlement of Vienna* (1815) and the European order of a balance of power based on a Concert of Europe (1815–1914) in an era of imperialism (Africa, Asia) and the post-colonial liberation in Latin America.
- The *Peace of Versailles* (1919) with a collapse of the European world order, a declining imperialism and the emergence of two new power centres in the US and in the USSR with competing political, social, economic, and cultural designs and a new global world order based on the security system of the *League of Nations* (1919–1939).
- The *Political Settlement of Yalta* (February 1945) and the system of the United Nations discussed at the Conferences in Dumbarton Oaks (1944), *Chapultepec* (January/ February 1945), and adopted at *San Francisco* (April/June 1945).

With these turning points during the European dominance of world history, the thinking on security changed. External and internal security became major tasks of the modern dynastic state. With the French Revolution and its intellectual and political consequences the thinking on '*Rechtssicherheit*' (legal predictability guaranteed by a state based on laws) gradually evolved. With the Covenant of the League of Nation '*collective security*' became a key concept in international law and in international relations (IR).

Since 1945, this 'national security' concept has become a major focus of the IR discipline that gradually spread from iAberystwyth (1919) via the US after 1945 to the rest of the world. The Cold War (1946–1989) was both a political, military, and economic struggle and an ideological, social, and cultural competition when the modern 'security concept' emerged as a political and a scientific concept in the social sciences that was intellectually dominated by the American (Katzenstein 1996) and Soviet (Adomeit 1998) strategic culture. With the end of the Cold War, the systemic conflict between both superpowers and nuclear deterrence became obsolete and its prevailing security concepts had to be reconsidered and adjusted to the new political conditions, security dangers, and concerns.

This process of rethinking or 'reconceptualization of security concepts' and 'redefinition of security interests' that was triggered by the global turn of 1989–1991 and slightly modified by the events of 11 September 2001 (Der Derian 2004; Kupchan 2005; Risse 2005; Müller 2005; Guzzini 2005) and the subsequent US-led 'war on terror' has become a truly global process.

The intellectual dominance of the two Cold War superpowers has been replaced by an intellectual pluralism representing the manifold intellectual traditions but also the cultural and religious diversity. In this and the two subsequent volumes authors representing the five billion people outside the North Atlantic are given a scientific 'voice' that is often ignored in the inward oriented national security discourses that may contribute little to an understanding of these newly emerging intellectual debates after the end of the Cold War.

According to Tierney and Maliniak (2005: 58–64): "American scholars are a relatively insular group who primarily assign American authors to their students."[2] In an overview of three rival theories of realism, liberalism and idealism (constructivism), Snyder (2004: 53–62) listed among the founders of realism (Morgenthau, Waltz) and idealism (Wendt, Ruggie) only Americans but of liberalism two Europeans (Smith, Kant). Among the thinkers in all three schools of realism (Mearsheimer, Walt), liberalism (Doyle, Keohane, Ikenberry) and idealism (Barnett and the only two women: Sikkink, Finnemore) again only Americans

qualified. This may reflect the prevailing image of the 'us' and 'they'. But in a second survey Malinak, Oakes, Peterson and Tierney (2007: 62–68) concluded that:

> 89 per cent of scholars believe that the war [in Iraq] will ultimately decrease US security. 87 per cent consider the conflict unjust, and 85 per cent are pessimistic about the chances of achieving a stable democracy in Iraq in the next 10–15 years. ... 96 per cent view the United States as less respected today than in the past (Malinak/Oakes/Peterson/Tierney 2007: 63).

A large majority of US IR scholars opposed unilateral US military intervention and called for a UN endorsement. Seventy per cent describe themselves as liberals and only 13 per cent as conservative. Their three most pressing foreign-policy issues during the next 10 years reflect the official policy agenda: international terrorism (50 per cent), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (45 per cent), the rise of China (40 per cent). Only a minority consider global warming (29 per cent), global poverty (19 per cent) and resource scarcity (14 percent) as the most pressing issues.r

These snapshots refer to a certain parochialism within the IR discipline which made the perception of the global process of reconceptualization of security, and of new centres of conceptual innovation on security more difficult. But the thinking of the writers outside the North Atlantic and their different concerns matter in the 21st century when the centres of economic, political, and military power may shift to other parts of the world (see part IX in this book).

1.5 Drivers and Centres of Conceptual Innovation

The drivers of the theoretical discourse on security and the intellectual centres of conceptual innovation have moved away from both Russia (after 1989) but gradually also from the United States. During the 1980's, the conceptual thinking on 'alternative security' or 'defensive defence' in Europe was looking for political and military alternatives to the mainstream deterrence doctrines and nuclear policies (Weizsäcker 1972; Afheldt 1976; SAS 1984, 1989; Brauch/Kennedy 1990, 1992, 1993; Møller 1991, 1992, 1995). It was a major intellectual force behind the independent 'peace movement' that called for both disarmament and human rights in both camps (e.g. END, 1980–1989).

In 2007, the discourses on security are no longer a primarily American social science (Crawford/Jarvis 2001; Hoffmann 2001; Nossal 2001; Zürn 2003). The critiques of peace researchers and alternative security experts in Europe during the 1970's and 1980's, but also new national perspectives during the 1990's, e.g. in France (Lacoste, Bigo, Badie), in the UK (Buzan, Booth, Smith, Rogers), Canada (Porter 2001), Germany (Albrecht, Czempiel, Senghaas, Rittberger) challenged American conceptualizations of national security. Since the 1990's in Southern Europe a re-emergence of geopolitics (France, Italy, Spain) could be observed (Brauch, chap. 22). In other parts of the world a critical or new geopolitics school emerged (O'Tuahthail, Dalby) but also a spatialization of global challenges (ecological geopolitics or political geo-ecology). In Germany there has been a focus on progressing debordering, or deterritorialization of political processes (Wolf, Zürn) primarily in the EU while new barriers were directed against immigration from the South in both the US (toward Mexico) and in Europe (in the Mediterranean).

Groom and Mandaville (2001: 151) noted an "increasingly influential European set of influences that have historically, and more recently, informed the disciplinary concerns and character of IR" that have been stimulated by the writings of Foucault, Bourdieu, Luhmann, Habermas, Beck and from peace research by Galtung, Burton, Bouthoul, Albrecht, Czempiel, Rittberger, Senghaas, Väyrynen. Since the 1980's, the conceptual visions of African (Nkruma, Nyerere and Kaunda) and Arab leaders (Nasser), as well as the Southern concepts of self-reliance and Latin American theories of 'dependencia' of the 1960's and 1970's (Furtado 1965; Marini 1973; Dos Santos 1978) had only a minor impact on Western thinking in international relations and on security.

Since 1990 the new centres of conceptual innovation are no longer the US Department of Defense or the US academic centres in security studies in the Ivy League programmes. The effort by US neo-conservatives to reduce the global security agenda to weapons

2 They claimed: "The subject may be international relations, but the readings are overwhelmingly American. Almost half of the scholars surveyed report that 10 per cent or less of the material in their introductory courses is written by non-Americans, with a full 10 per cent of professors responding that they do not assign any authors from outside the United States. Only 5 per cent of instructors give non-Americans equal billing on their syllabuses" (Tierney/Malinak 2005: 63). While one third in the US IR field are women, among the 25 most influential scholars are only men, among them many are considered leading security experts.

of mass destruction and to the 'war on terror' has also failed, and many scholars share the scepticism.

However, most journals on security studies (e.g. *International Security*) are produced in the US and the North American market has remained the biggest book market for the security related literature. Since 1990 new journals on IR and security problems have evolved elsewhere, and since 1992 the triennial pan-European Conferences on International Relations (ECPR) in Heidelberg (1992), Paris (1995), Vienna (1998), Canterbury (2001), The Hague (2004) and Turino (2007) have supplemented the Annual International Studies Association conferences in North America where the intellectual debates on both security, peace, environment, and development are taking place. In August 2005 ECPR and ISA with partners in other parts of the world organized the first world conference on international relations in Istanbul.

In the political realm, the US as the only remaining superpower – irrespective of its 48 per cent contribution to global arms expenditures (SIPRI 2006) – has lost its predominance to set and control the international security agenda and US scholars no longer set the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical agenda of the scientific security discourse. In Europe and elsewhere new centres of intellectual and conceptual innovation have emerged in the security realm:

- In Europe, *Aberystwyth*, *Paris*, and *Copenhagen* have been associated with three new critical 'schools' on security theory (Wæver 2004).
- The *Copenhagen School* combined peace research with the Grotian tradition of the English School, integrating inputs from Scandinavian, British, German, and French discourses (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1997; Wæver/Buzan/de Wilde 2008).
- The *human security concept* was promoted by Mahub ul Haq (Pakistan) with the UNDP report of 1994 and then developed further with Japanese support by the *Human Security Commission* (2003) and promoted both by UNESCO and UNU globally.
- Civil society organizations in South Asia developed the concept of *livelihood security*.
- International organizations introduced the sectoral concepts of *energy* (IEA, OECD), *food* (FAO, WFP), *water* (UNEP) *and health* (WHO) *security* (see Hexagon vol. IV).
- In the US and Canada, and in Switzerland and Norway the concept of *environmental security* as security concerns emerged during the 1980's and 1990's.
- Since 1990 the epistemic community of the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) provoked a global scientific and policy debate on climate change.
- The *Earth System Science Partnership* (ESSP) and its four programmes: IHDP (*International Human Dimensions Programme*), IGBP (*International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme*), WCRP (*World Climate Research Programme*) and *Diversitas* and its project GECHS (*Global Environmental Change and Human Security*) resulted in global scientific networks that address new security dangers and concerns.

Trends in the *reconceptulization of security* that will be mapped in the Hexagon Series are:

- *widening*, *deepening*, and *sectorialization* of security concepts;
- shift of referent object from the state to human beings or humankind (*human security*);
- perception of *new security dangers* (threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks) and *securitization* of new security concerns due to an articulation by national and international organizations, scientific epistemic communities, and an attentive public with a progressing decentralization and diversity of information control through the internet;
- search for new non-military strategies to face and cope with these newly perceived security dangers and concerns and new environmental dangers, hazards, and disasters that pose no classical security dilemma (Herz 1950, 1959, 1962) for states but a 'survival dilemma' (Brauch 2004, chap. 40) for people.

These new drivers and centres of conceptual innovation have fundamentally challenged the narrow state-focused security concept of the traditionalists and realists in the Cold War.

1.6 History, Social Sciences, Philosophy, International Law

Events, structures, and concepts stand for three different historical approaches of:

- a *history of events* (of states and government elites) in diplomacy, conflicts, and wars focusing on the activities of states during wars;

- a *history of structures* (history of 'longue durée' and of conjunctural cycles) in the accounts on social, societal, and economic history;
- a history of ideas ('*Ideengeschichte*') and concepts ('*Begriffsgeschichte*').

1.6.1 Contextual Change and Conceptual History

The history of concepts was instrumental for a major German editorial project on key historical concepts (Brunner/Conze/Koselleck 1972–1997). Koselleck (1979, 1989, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2006) addressed the complex interlinkages between the temporal features of events, structures, and concepts in human (societal) history but also the dualism between experience and concepts (chap. 3 by Brauch). '

Conze (1984: 831–862) reviewed the evolution of the meaning of the German concepts security ('Sicherheit') and protection ('Schutz') that evolved – based on Roman and Medieval sources – since the 17th century with the dynastic state and was closely linked to the modern state. Since 1648 internal security was distinguished from external security which became a key concept of foreign and military policy and of international law. During the 17th and 18th centuries internal security was stressed by Hobbes and Pufendorf as the main task of the sovereign for the people.

In the American constitution, safety is linked to liberty. During the French Revolution the declaration of citizens' rights declared security as one of its four basic human rights. For Wilhelm von Humboldt the state became a major actor to guarantee internal and external security while Fichte stressed the concept of mutuality where the state as the granter of security and the citizen interact. Influenced by Kant, Humboldt, and Fichte the concept of the '*Rechtsstaat*' (legally constituted state) and *'Rechtssicherheit'* (legal predictability of the state) became key features of the thinking on security in the early 19th century (Conze 1984).

The concept of 'social security' gradually evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially during F.D. Roosevelt's New Deal as a key goal to advance the security of the citizens: "the security of the home, the security of the livelihood, and the security of the social insurance." This was addressed in the *Atlantic Charter* of 1941 as "securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security." In 1948 social security became a key human right in Art. 22 of the General Declaration of Human Rights.

The 'national' security concept in the US resulted in the emergence of the American security system (Czempiel 1966), or of a national security state (Yergin 1977). It was used to legitimate a major shift in the mindset from the isolationism of the 1930's to the internationalism in the post-war years, i.e. from a fundamental criticism of military armaments to a legitimization of an unprecedented military and arms build-up and militarization of the mindset of post-war foreign policy elites.

The changes in the thinking on security and their embodiment in security concepts are also a semantic reflection of the fundamental changes as they have been perceived in different parts of the world and conceptually articulated in alternative or new and totally different security concepts. Competing securitization efforts of terrorism or climate change are behind the transatlantic and global security policy debate and the global scientific conceptual discourse.

1.6.2 Conceptual Mapping in the Social Sciences

In the social sciences, the security concept has been widely used in *political science* (chap. 37 by Baylis in this vol.), and *economics* (chap. 36 by Mursheed and 43 Mesjasz) that focus on different actors: on the political realm (governments, parliaments, public, media, citizens); on society (societal groups) and on the business community (firms, customers, economic and fiscal policies). In political science, the security concept has been used in its threefold context: *policy* (field of security policy), *politics* (process on security, military, and arms issues), and *polity* (legal norms, laws, and institutions on the national and international level). The US National Security Act of 1947 (Czempiel 1966, Brauch 1977) and its adjustments has created the legal and institutional framework for the evolution of the 'national security state', sometimes also referred to as a military-industrial complex (Eisenhower 1972). This evolution has been encapsulated in the US debate on the concepts of 'national' and since 2001 also 'homeland' security.

1.6.3 Analysis of Concepts and their Linkages in Philosophy

The evolution and systematic analysis of concepts has been a major task of political philosophy and of the history of ideas. In German several philosophical publications documented the contemporary philosophy and its concepts in its interrelationship to their hi-

storical structure and the sciences.[3] From a philosophical perspective after the end of the Cold War, Makropoulos (1995: 745–750) analysed the evolution of the German concept 'Sicherheit' from its Latin and Greek origins and its evolution and transformation during the medieval period, after the reformation as a concept in theology, philosophy, politics and law, with a special focus on Hobbes, Locke, Wolff, Rousseau, and Kant. In the 20th century he reviewed the prevention and compensation of genuinely social and technical insecurity as well as new social risks. While this article briefly noted the concept of 'social security' the key concept of 'national security' or the more recent concepts of 'human security' were not mentioned.

1.6.4 Security Concepts in National Public and International Law

Since the 18th century the security concept was widely used in the context of constitutional or public law for the legal system providing '*Rechtssicherheit*' for the citizens in their engagement with the state. The concepts of 'international peace and security' have been repeatedly used in the Covenant and in the UN Charter where Art. 1,1 outlines its key purpose:

> to maintain international peace and *security*, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ... 2. to develop friendly relations among nations ... 3. to achieve international cooperation ... [and] 4. to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Wolfrum (1994: 51) points to the subjective and objective elements of 'international security', the pursuit of which "implies a transformation of international relations so that every state is assured that peace will not be broken, or at least that any breach of the peace will be limited in its impact." In addition he referred to the "defining characteristic of the concept of collective security [as] the protection of the members of the system against a possible attack on the part of any other member of the same system," and he noted that "the distinction drawn between the concepts of collective security and collective self-defence has been blurred to some extent in practice, and it also has lost relevance with respect to the United Nations" because due to the universal nature of the UN system "any distinction based upon external or internal acts of aggression [have been rendered] meaningless."

1.6.5 Debate on Security Concepts within the United Nations

In a report of the Secretary-General on *Concepts of Security* (UN 1986)[4] that was prepared by government experts from Algeria, Venezuela, Sweden (chair), China, GDR, Romania, Uganda, USSR, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Malaysia, India and Australia security was defined as:

> a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. International security is thus the result and the sum of the security of each and every State member of the international community; accordingly, international security cannot be reached without full international cooperation. However, security is a relative rather than an absolute term. National and international security need to be viewed as matters of degree (UN 1986: 2).

Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar noted that "concepts of security are the different bases on which States and the international community as a whole rely for their security" and he observed that "the

3 See e.g. the historical dictionary of philosophy (*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*) published first in 1899 by Rudolf Eisler, and its fourth edition (1927–1930). A different approach was pursued in the new *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, launched and edited by Joachim Ritter and written by a team of more than 1,500 scholars that has been published in twelve volumes between 1971 and 2004. It includes four types of contributions: a) terminological articles, b) key concepts with minor changes in history, c) combined concepts in their systematic context (e.g. in logic), and d) historical method for more detailed articles that track the continuity and change of concepts from Classical Greek to contemporary philosophical treatments.

4 The GA in Res. 37/99 of 13 December 1983 called for "a comprehensive study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize cooperative efforts and mutual understanding between states, with a view of developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in relations between states, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and promoting political and economic security (UN DOC A/40/533)." This resulted in several reports published by the Secretary-General on the "Relationship between Disarmament and International Security" (Disarmament Study Series No. 8, 1982); on "Concepts of Security" (Disarmament Study Series No. 14, 1986) and on "Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies" (Disarmament Study Series No. 26, 1993).

group recognized the different security concepts [that] have evolved in response to the need for national security and as a result of changing political, military, economic and other circumstances." He summarized the group's common understanding on six elements of a security concept:

a) All nations have the right to security.
b) The use of military force for purposes other then self-defence is no legitimate instrument of national policy.
c) Security should be understood in comprehensive terms, recognizing the growing interdependence of political, military, economic, social, geographical and technological factors.
d) Security is the concern of all nations and in the light of the threat of proliferating challenges to global security all nations have the right and duty to participate in the search for constructive solutions.
e) The world's diversities with respect to ethnic origins, language, culture, history, customs, ideologies, political institutions, socio-economic systems and levels of development should not be allowed to constitute obstacles to international cooperation for peace and security.
f) Disarmament and arms limitation...is an important approach to international peace and security and it has thus become the most urgent task facing the entire international community (UN 1986: v-vi).

Since 1990, Secretaries-General Boutros Ghali (1992, 1995) and Annan (2005) have conceptualized 'security' and 'human security' that according to Annan's report *In Longer Freedom* is based on 'freedom from want', 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom to live in dignity'.

For the post Cold War (1990–2006) years, Michael Bothe (chap. 35) reviewed the changes in the use of the concept of security in UNSC decisions on activities that have been considered as threats to 'international peace and security' or as 'breaches of peace'. Jürgen Dedring (chap. 46) reviewed the introduction of the 'human security' concept in the deliberations of the Security Council as a result of the activities of Canada on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts while Fuentes (2002; 2008) analysed the activities of the Human Security Network in the promotion of a common human security agenda within and outside of the UN system.

In the scientific disciplines reviewed in this volume, key changes could be noticed in the meaning of the concept of security as well as in the five dimensions of a wider security concept. This process of reconceptualizing security since 1990 could also be observed in statements of international organizations (UN, OSCE, EU, OECD, NATO) and in the interfaces between security and development. Much evidence could be found for the working hypothesis that the global turn has resulted in a reconceptualization of security.

1.6.6 Reconceptualization of Regional Security

New security concepts have been adopted with the *Declaration of the Organization of American States* in October 2003 in Mexico (chap. 69 by Rojas), with the *European Security Strategy* of 2003 (chap. 51 by Hintermeier) by the European Union, by the United Nations in 2005 (chap. 47 by Einsiedel/Nitschke), as well as by NATO (chap. 55 by Dunay; chap. 56 by Bin) but also new collective security tasks have been taken up by the UN Security Council.

However, this retrospective analysis is not sufficient. With the ongoing globalization process, new transnational non-state actors (from transnational corporations, to terrorist and crime networks) have directly affected objective security dangers and subjective concerns. It is not only 'international terrorism' that has become a major new security danger and thus the major object of securitization in many US national security policy statements and in numerous UN and other resolutions by IGOs, threats to 'human security' in other parts of the world are also posed by the impact of global climate change via an increase in the number and intensity of natural hazards and disasters (storms, cyclones, hurricanes but also drought) that are caused by anthropogenic activities that are partly responsible for the misery of those affected most by extreme weather events (e.g. by cyclones in Bangladesh or by drought in the Sahel zone). These events have contributed to internal displacement and migration and have thus reached the North as new 'soft' security problems (Brauch 2002; Oswald 2007).

All these developments caused by global environmental change have contributed to the emergence of a new phase in earth history, the "anthropocene" (Crutzen 2002; Crutzen/Stoermer 2000; Clark/Crutzen/Schellnhuber; Oswald/Brauch/Dalby 2008) that poses new security dangers and concerns, and for many people in the South and for some of the most vulnerable and affected also a 'survival dilemma' (Brauch 2004, and chap. 42).

Thus, besides the global turn of 1990, several regional and national structural changes, the impacts of globalization, and with global environmental change a new set of dangers and concerns for the security and survival of humankind are evolving. The perception of or the securitization of these new security dangers as threats for international, regional, national, and human security have all contributed to a reconceptualization of security.

1.7 Three Volumes on Reconceptualizing Security

This book is the first of three volumes that address different aspects of an 'intellectual mapping' of the ongoing process of reconceptualizing security. The two related volumes address:

- *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*;
- *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security – Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks.*

These three books in the *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* (HESP) aim to achieve these scientific goals: a) a global *North-South scientific debate* on *reconceptualizing security*; b) a *multidisciplinary debate* and learning; and c) a *dialogue between academia and policymakers* in international organizations, national governments and *between academia and* nongovernmental actors in civil society and in social movements on security concepts. These three volumes focus on the conceptual thinking on a wide notion of security in all parts of the world that is used to legitimate the allocation of public and private resources and to justify the use of force both to 'protect' and to 'kill' people in the realization of major values.

The 'hexagon' represents six key factors contributing to global environmental change – three nature-induced or supply factors: soil, water and air (atmosphere and climate), and three human-induced or demand factors: population change (growth and decline), urban systems (industry, habitat, pollution) and rural systems (agriculture, food, nature protection). Throughout the history of the earth and of the homo sapiens these six factors have interacted. The supply factors have created the preconditions for life while human behaviour and economic consumption patterns have contributed to its challenges (increase in extreme weather events) and fatal outcomes for human beings and society. The Hexagon series will cover the complex interactions among these six factors and their extreme and in some cases even fatal outcomes (hazards/disasters, internal displacements and forced migration, crises, and conflicts), as well as crucial social science concepts relevant for their analysis.

Issues in three research fields on environment, security, and peace, especially in the environmental security realm and from a human security perspective, will be addressed with the goal to contribute to a fourth phase of research on environmental security from a normative peace research and/or human security perspective (Brauch 2003; Dalby/Brauch/Oswald 2008). This book series offers a platform for scientific communities dealing with global environmental and climate change, disaster reduction, environmental security, peace and conflict research, as well as for the humanitarian aid and the policy community in governments and international organizations.

1.8 Goals, Structure, Authors and Audience of this Book

The basic research questions this global reference book addresses are threefold:

- Did these manifold structural changes in the political order trigger a rethinking or *reconceptualization* of the key 'security concept' globally, nationally, and locally?
- To which extent were two other global processes instrumental for this new thinking on security: a) the process of economic, political, and cultural *globalization* and b) the evolving perception of the impact of *global environmental change* (GEC) due to climate change, soil erosion, and desertification as well as water scarcity and deterioration?
- Or were the changes in the thinking on security the result of a scientific revolution (Kuhn 1962) resulting in a major paradigm shift?

1.8.1 Theoretical Contexts for Security Reconceptualizations

The first two chapters introduce into the international debate on reconceptualizing security since 1989. *Czeslaw Mesjasz* approaches the reconceptualizing of security from the vantage point of systems theory as attributes of social systems.

1.8.2 Security, Peace, Development and Environment

Hans Günter Brauch (chap. 3) introduces a conceptual quartet consisting of *Security, Peace, Environment and Development* that are addressed by four specialized research programmes of peace research, security, development, and environmental studies. After an analysis of six linkages between these key concepts, four linkage concepts will be discussed: a) the *security dilemma* (for the peace-security linkage); b) the concept of *sustainable development* (for the development-environment linkage); c) *sustainable peace* (peace-development-environment linkage) and the new concept of a d) *survival dilemma* (security-environment-development linkage). Six experts review the debates on efforts to reconceptualize these six dyadic linkages: 1: peace and security (chap. 4 by *Ole Wæver*); 2: peace and development (chap. 5 by *Indra de Soysa*.); 3: peace and environment (chap. 6 by *Úrsula Oswald Spring*); 4: development and security (chap. 7 by *Peter Uvin*); 5: development and environment (chap. 8 by *Casey Brown*); and 6: security and environment (chap. 9 by *Simon Dalby*).

While since the French Revolution (1789) many political concepts (including *peace* and *security*) were reconceptualized, the political concepts of *development* and *environment* have gradually evolved since the 1950's and 1970's on national and international political agendas. The authors of chapters 4 to 9 were invited to consider these questions:

a) Has the peace and security agenda in the UN Charter been adapted to a global contextual change with the disappearance of bipolarity and the emergence of a single superpower? Has the understanding of the classic concepts affecting peace and security: sovereignty, non-use of force (Art. 2,4) and non-intervention (Art. II,7 of UN Charter) changed with the increase of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations?
b) Which impact did the increase in violence in Europe since 1991, the emergence of new asymmetric, ethno-religious, internal conflicts, and the challenge by non-state actors in a rapidly globalizing world have on the theoretical debates on the six dyadic linkages?
c) Which impact did the change in the peace-security dyad have on environment and development concepts? Did environment and development policies benefit from the global turn? Was it instrumental for the increase in 'failing states' (Somalia, Afghanistan)?
d) Have the summits in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED, 1992) and in Johannesburg (UNSSD, 2002), and the formulation of the *Millennium Development Goals* benefited from the turn?
e) Has the attack of 11 September 2001 on the US changed the priorities of security and development policies, nationally, regionally and globally?

Not all authors have responded to these questions, rather they discussed questions they considered the most relevant from their respective scientific and research perspective. They have widened and deepened the concepts from disciplines and have introduced southern perspectives to the security discourse.

1.8.3 Philosophical, Ethical, and Religious Contexts for Reconceptualizing Security

During the Cold War national and international security was a key policy concept for allocating financial resources and legitimating policies on the use of force. During this period the thinking on security of American and Soviet scholars dominated the paradigms and conceptual debates in the West and East, but also in the divided South. With the end of the Cold War this conceptual dichotomy was overcome. In the post Cold War era, prior to and after 11 September 2001, theoreticians have reconceptualized security in different directions.

Samuel P. Huntington's (1996) simplification of a new 'Islamic-Confucian threat' used cultural notions to legitimate military postures to stabilize the Western dominance and US leadership. Huntington provoked many critical replies by scholars from different regions, cultures and religions. Instead of reducing 'culture' to an object for the legitimization of the military power of one country, the authors in part III have been asked to review the thinking on security in their own culture or religion as it has evolved over centuries and has and may still influence implicitly the thinking and action of policymakers in their region.

Introducing part III, *Úrsula Oswald Spring* (Mexico, chap. 10) compares the thinking on peace in the East, West, and South. Eight chapters were written by authors representing different cultures and religions: *Eun-Jeung Lee* (Korea, chap. 13 on: Security in Confucianism and in Korean philosophy and ethics); *Mitsuo* and *Tamayo Okamoto* (Japan, chap. 14 on: Security in Japanese philosophy and ethics); *Naresh Dadhich* (India, chap. 15 on: Thinking on security in Hinduism and in contemporary political philosophy and ethics in India); *Robert Eisen* (USA, chap. 16 on security in

Jewish philosophy and ethics); *Frederik Arends* (Netherlands, chap. 17: security in Western philosophy and ethics); *Hassan Hanafi* (Egypt, chap. 18: security in Arab and Muslim philosophy and ethics); *Jacob Emmanuel Mabe* (Cameroon/Germany, chap. 19: Security in African philosophy, ethics and history of ideas); *Georgina Sánchez* (Mexico, chap. 20: Security in Mesoamerican philosophy, ethics and history of ideas); *Domício Proença Júnior* and *Eugenio Diniz* (Brazil, chap. 21: The Brazilian view on the conceptualization of security: philosophical, ethical and cultural contexts and issues); while *Michael von Brück* (Germany, chap. 11: security in Buddhism and Hinduism), and *Kurt W. Radtke* (Germany/Netherlands, chap. 12: Security in Chinese, Korean and Japanese philosophy and ethics) compare the thinking on security in two eastern religions and the thinking in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese philosophy and ethics. The authors were invited to discuss these questions:

a) Which security concepts have been used in the respective philosophy, ethics, and religion?
b) How have these concepts evolved in different philosophical, ethical, and religious debates?
c) What are the referents of the thinking on security: a) humankind, b) the nation state, c) society, or d) the individual human being?
d) How are these concepts being used today and do these religious and philosophical traditions still influence the thinking of decision-makers on security in the early 21st century?
e) Did the global contextual change of 1990 as well as the events of 11 September 2001 have an impact on the religious, philosophical, and ethical debates related to security?

The goal of this part is to sensitize the readers not to perceive the world only through the narrow conceptual lenses prevailing primarily in the Western or North Atlantic debates on security concepts and policies. Rather, the cultural, philosophical and religious diversity that influence the thinking on and related policies may sensitize policymakers.

1.8.4 Spatial Context and Referents of Security Concepts

During the Cold War the narrow 'national security' concept has prevailed (table 1.2). Since 1990 two parallel debates have taken place among analysts of *globalization* (in OECD countries) focusing on processes of de-territorialization and de-borderization as well as proponents of new 'spatial' approaches to international relations (*geo-strategy, geopolitics, geo-economics*). There was no significant controversy between both schools. Both approaches may contribute to an understanding of the co-existence of pre-modern, modern and post-modern thinking on sovereignty and its relationship to security. The major dividing line between both perspectives, often pursued in the tradition of realism or pragmatism, is the role of 'space' in international affairs (see chap. 22 by Brauch).

In the Westphalian system sovereign states may be defined in terms of a) territory, b) people, and c) government (system of rule). Thus, the territorial category of 'space' has been a constituent of modern international politics. No state exits without a clearly defined territory. 'Spatiality' is the term used to describe the dynamic and interdependent relationship between a society's construction of space on society (Soja 1985). This concept applies not only to the social level, but also to the individual, for it draws attention to the fact that this relationship takes place through individual human actions, and also constrains and enables these actions (Giddens 1984). During the 1960's and 1970's, spatial science was widely used in geography and it attracted practitioners interested in 'spatial order' and in related policies (Schmidt 1995: 798–799). However, the micro level analyses in human geography are of no relevance for international relations where the concept of 'territoriality' is often used as:

> a strategy which uses bounded spaces in the exercise of power and influence. ... Most social scientists ... focus on the efficiency of territoriality as a strategy, in a large variety of circumstances, involving the exercise of power, influence and domination. ... The efficiency of territoriality is exemplified by the large number of 'containers' into which the earth's surface is divided. By far the best example of its benefits to those wishing to exercise power is the state, which is necessarily a territorial body. Within its territory, the state apparatus assumes sovereign power: all residents are required to 'obey the laws of the land' in order for the state to undertake its central roles within society; boundaries are policed to control people and things entering and leaving. Some argue that territoriality is a necessary strategy for the modern state, which could not operate successfully without it (Johnston 1996: 871; Mann 1984).

This very notion of the '*territoriality*' of the state has been challenged by international relations specialists. Herz (1959) argued that the territorial state could easily be penetrated by intercontinental missiles armed with nuclear weapons. In the 1970's, some globalists announced the death of the state as the key actor of international politics, and during the recent debate some analysts of *globalization* proclaimed the end of

the nation state and a progressing deborderization and deterritorialization have become key issues of analysis from the two opposite and competing perspectives of globalization and *geopolitique* but also from critical geopolitics. For the deborderized territories a new form of *raison d'état* may be needed.

The authors of part IV have been invited to address the following questions:

a) Has the debate on security been influenced by the two schools focusing on globalization and geopolitics as well as by pre-modern, modern, and postmodern thinking on space?
b) To which extent have there been changes in the spatial referents of security, with regard to global environmental change, globalization, regionalization, the nation state, as well as sub-national actors, such as societal, ethnic and religious groups, terrorist networks, or transnational criminal groups active in narco-trafficking?

The authors of the twelve chapters address two competing approaches of globalization vs. critical geopolitics or ecological geopolitics vs. political geo-ecology (chap. 22 by *Hans Günter Brauch*); on astructural setting for global environmental politics in a hierarchic international system from a geopolitical view (chap. 23 by *Vilho Harle* and *Sami Moisio*); the role and contributions of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) project within IHDP (Chap. 24 by *Jon Barnett*, *Karen O'Brien* and *Richard Matthew*); globalization and security: the US 'Imperial Presidency': global impacts in Iraq and Mexico (chap. 25 by *John Saxe-Fernández*); and on: Globalization from below: The World Social Forum: A platform for reconceptualizing security? (chap. 26: by *Úrsula Oswald Spring*).

Mustafa Aydin and *Sinem Acikmese* (chap. 27) discuss identity-based security threats in a globalized world with a focus on Islam, while *Björn Hettne* (chap. 28): in world regions as referents reviews concepts of regionalism and regionalization of security. *Bharat Karnad* (chap. 29) addresses the nation state as the key referent with a focus on concepts of national security, while *Varun Sahni* (chap. 30) provides a critical analysis of the role of sub-national actors (society, ethnic, religious groups) as referents. *Gunhild Hoogensen* (chap. 31) focuses on terrorist networks and *Arlene B. Tickner* and *Ann C. Mason* (chap. 32) on criminal narco-traffic groups as non-state actors as referents and finally *Jacek Kugler* (chap. 33) offers his ideas on reconceptualizing of security research by integrating individual level data.

1.8.5 Reconceptualization of Security in Scientific Disciplines

The security concept is used in many scientific disciplines and programmes. In this part *Jean Marc Coicaud* (chap. 34) contemplates on security as a philosophical construct, *Michael Bothe* (chap. 35) offers an empirical review of the changing security concept as reflected in resolutions of the UN Security Council, while *S. Mansoob Murshed* (chap. 36) discusses the changing use of security in economics, *John Baylis* (chap. 37) reviews the changing use of the security concept in international relations, and *Ulrich Albrecht* and *Hans Günter Brauch* (chap. 38) reconstruct the changes in the security concept in security studies and peace research. The authors were invited to discuss these questions:

a) Did a reconceptualization of security occur in these scientific disciplines and programmes?
b) Did the global turn of 1990 and the events of 11 September 2001 have an influence or major impact on a reconceptualization of security or have other developments (e.g. globalization or demography) or events been more instrumental?
c) Which other factors were instrumental for a reconceptualization, e.g. of risk, risk society and modernity, that directly influence the scientific debate on security?

1.8.6 Reconceptualizing Dimensions of Security since 1990

Laura Shepherd and *Jutta Weldes* (chap. 39) introduce into the sixth part by discussing security as the state (of) being free from danger, and *Hans Günter Brauch* (chap. 40) contrasts the state-centred 'security dilemma' (Herz 1959) with a people-centred 'survival dilemma'. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) distinguished among five sectors or dimensions of security of which they analyse in this book the military (*Buzan*, chap. 41), societal (*Wæver*, chap. 44), and environmental (*de Wilde*, chap. 45) security dimensions while the political one is discussed by *Thomaz Guedes da Costa* (chap. 42) and economic one by *Czesaw Mesjasz* (chap. 43). They were invited to reflect on these questions:

a) To which extent have new theoretical paradigms, approaches, and concepts in different parts of the world influenced the reconceptualization of security dimensions?

b) To which extent have different worldviews, cognitive lenses, and mindsets framed the securitization of the five key sectors or dimensions of security?
c) To which extent has the conceptualization of the five sectors or dimensions of security been influenced by the global turn of 1989 and by the events of 11 September 2001?
d) Has there been a fundamental difference in the perception of the impact of both events in Europe, in the USA, and in other parts of the world for the five security dimensions?
e) Has the policy relevance of different security dimensions contributed to competing security agendas, and were they instrumental for the clash among conflicting views of security in the UN Security Council since 2002, prior to and after the war in Iraq?

1.8.7 Institutional Security Concepts Revisited for the 21st Century

With the end of the Cold War, the bipolar system that relied primarily on systems of collective self-defence (Art. 51 of UN Charter) has been overcome with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1991. In a brief interlude from 1991–1994, the systems of global and regional collective security were on the rise, and even NATO, the only remaining system of collective self-defence, was ready to act under a mandate of the CSCE, or since 1994 of the OSCE. However, with the failure of the UN and OSCE to cope with the conflicts in the post Yugoslav space, since 1994 NATO's relevance grew again, and with its gradual enlargement from 16 to 27 countries, NATO has again become the major security institution for hard security issues while the role of the UN system and of its regional collective security organizations expanded also into the soft 'human' security areas.

Since 1994, when UNDP first introduced the human security concept, this concept has been debated by the UN Security Council (see chap. 46 by *Jürgen Dedring*), in reports by the UN Secretary-General (chap. 47 by *Sebastian Einsiedel*, *Heiko Nitzschke* and *Tarun Chhabra*) and has been used by UNDP as well as by UNESCO and other UN organizations such as UNU (Bogardi/Brauch 2005, 2005a). The reconceptualization of security in the CSCE and OSCE since 1990 is documented by *Monika Wohlfeld* (chap. 49).

Four chapters review the complex reconceptualization of security by and within the European Union, from the perspective of the chair of the EU's Military Committee (Chap. 50 by General *Rolando Mosca Moschini*) who presents its comprehensive security concept, while *Stefan Hintermeier* (chap. 51) focuses on the reconceptualization of the EU's foreign and security policy since 1990 and *Andreas Maurer* and *Roderick Parkes* (chap. 52) deal with the EU's justice and home affairs policy and democracy from the Amsterdam to The Hague Programme and finally *Magnus Ekengren* (chap. 53) focuses on the EU's functional security by moving from intergovernmental to community-based security concepts and policies.

Two chapters focus on the reconceptualization of security in NATO since 1990 (*Pál Dunay*, chap. 55) and on NATO's role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East after the Istanbul Summit (*Alberto Bin*, chap. 56). The security and development nexus is introduced by *Peter Uvin* (chap. 8), the coordination issues within the UN system is addressed by Ole *Jacob Sending* (chap. 48) and the harmonization of the three goals of peace, security, and development for the EU by *Louka T. Katseli* (chap. 54). From the perspective of Germany *Stephan Klingebiel* and *Katja Roehder* (chap. 58) carry the considerations further by discussing the manifold new interfaces between development and security, while *Ortwin Hennig* and *Reinhold Elges* (chap. 57) review the German Action Plan for civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peace consolidation as a practical experience with the reconceptualization of security and its implementation in a new diplomatic instrument. The authors of part VII were asked to consider these questions:

a) Which concepts of security have been used by the respective international organizations in their charter and basic policy documents? To which extent has the understanding of security changed in the declaratory as well as in the operational policy of this security institution? To which extent was the global turn of 1989 instrumental for a reconceptualization of security by the UN, its independent global and regional organizations and programmes?
b) Has there been a shrinking of the prevailing post Cold War security concept since 11 September 2001, both in declaratory and operational terms? To which extent has there been a widening, a deepening or a sectorialization of security since 1990 in OSCE, EU and NATO, and to which extent has this been reflected in NATO's role in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East? And to which extent did the security institutions adopt the concepts of environmental and human security in their policy declarations and in their operative policy activities?

1.8.8 Reconceptualizing Regional Security for the 21st Century

A major reconceptualization of security has been triggered by the fundamental global contextual change that occurred with the end of the Cold War. The narrow Hobbesian view of security threats posed by the military capabilities and intentions of the other military alliance has been overcome and replaced by a widening, deepening and sectorialization of the regional thinking on security. The security concepts offer a framework for the analysis of hard security threats and manifold political, economic, environmental security challenges, vulnerabilities and risks. The redefinition of security interests by security institutions as influenced by the conceptual lenses that influence the subjective security perception.

Among the authors of part VIII are the foreign minister of Nigeria *Joy Ogwu* who offers a regional political security perspective from and for Western Africa (chap. 62) while *Alfred Nhema* and *Martin Rupiya* (Zimbabwe, chap. 63) provide a grim regional security perspective from and for the Horn, Eastern and Southern Africa, and *Naison Ngoma* and *Len le Roux* (Zambia, South Africa, chap. 64) offer a regional security perspective from and for Southern Africa.

The regional security in Europe in the 21st century is analyzed by *Sven Biscop* (Belgium, chap. 59), while *Mustafa Aydin* and *Neslihan Kaptanolu* (Turkey, chap. 60) discuss three concepts of regionalization of great power security concerns for the intertwining between the new neighborhood, the near abroad, and the greater and wider Middle East while *Bechir Chourou* (Tunisia, chap. 61) contributes a regional security perspective from and for the Arab world. Three regional security perspectives for three sub-regions in Asia are offered by *Navnita Chadha Behera* (India, chap. 65) for South Asia, by *Eu-Jeung Lee* (chap. 66) for China, South and North Korea and Japan and by *Liu Cheng* and *Alan Hunter* (China/UK, chap. 67) for China for the early 21st century. *Kevin P. Clements* and *Wendy L. Foley* (Australia, New Zealand, chap. 68) review the regional security debate in the South Pacific on peace and security with alternative formulations in the post-Cold War era and *Francisco Rojas Aravenna* (Chile, chap. 69) assesses the key regional security issues on the American continent, its challenges, perceptions, and concepts and *P.H. Liotta* (USA) and *James F. Miskel* (USA) offer thoughts for an ethical framework for security. The authors of part VIII were invited to consider these questions:

a) Which impact did scientific and political security discourses and communication processes have on the reconceptualization of regional security?
b) How relevant have security concepts been for the formulation of security interests in international politics and international relations? Which role has the rethinking of security in the new millennium played in regional debates on peace and security in Europe, in the Neighbourhood, Near Abroad, and Greater or Wider Middle East?

1.8.9 Reconceptualizing Security and Alternative Futures

This part will carry the discussion on security concepts into the future from a theoretical perspective on prediction in security theory and policy by *Czesaw Mesjasz* (chap. 71), from the vantage point of two military officers, *Heinz Dieter Jopp* and *Roland Kaestner* (chap. 72), and of an environmental and hazard specialist *Gordon A. McBean* (chap. 74) who discusses the role of prediction with regards to natural hazards and sustainable development. *Heikki Patomäki* (chap. 73) debates from a hypothetical scenario on learning from possible futures for global security.

1.8.10 Summary Conclusions

In this final part *Úrsula Oswald Spring* and *Hans Günter Brauch* (chap. 75) summarize the results of this global mapping of the rethinking on security. Based on the analysis of the trends in global thinking the authors discuss the policy relevance of security concepts for the structuring of the security debate and for policy-making both in national governments and in international organizations.

1.9 Editorial Process

As indicated above (1.7) this book differs from available publications on security by aiming at a fourfold dialogue. Such an ambitious effort may transcend the narrow professional or institutional horizon of some reviewers who often expect that such a project should be developed within the mainstream methodological approaches of international relations.

The editors pursue three goals: a) to contribute to *problem awareness* for the different security concepts in North and South, on hard and soft security issues, on non-military, primarily environmental challenges and environmental security problems; b) to stimulate

and encourage interdisciplinary scientific research and political efforts to resolve, prevent, and avoid that environmental factors may contribute to violent conflicts (both scientific and political *agenda-setting*); and c) to contribute to a better understanding of the complex interactions between natural processes, nature and human-induced regional environmental changes (*learning*).

While power has once been defined by Karl Deutsch (1963, 1966) as not having to learn, during the 20th century the resistance to any *anticipatory* learning by those who control the resources over outcomes has been significant. In history, it often required severe foreign policy and domestic crises (e.g. in the US in the 1970's during the Vietnam War and in the former Soviet Union in the 1980's during the Afghanistan War) to stimulate major re-assessments of existing foreign and security policies and to launch fundamental revisions.

Several scientists (E.U. von Weizsäcker 1989; E.O. Wilson 1998) have described the 21st century as the century of the environment. For the new century, Edward O. Wilson (1998a) has referred to a growing *consilience,* i.e. the interlocking of causal explanations across disciplines, what implies that the interfaces of disciplines become as important as the disciplines. Ted Munn (2002), in his preface to the *Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change*, argued based on Wilson:

> that this interlocking amongst the natural sciences will in the 21st century also touch 'the borders of the social sciences and humanities'. In the environmental context, environmental scientists in diverse specialties, including human ecology, are more precisely defining the area in which that species arose, and those parts that must be sustained for human survival (Wilson 1998).

Anticipatory learning must acknowledge this need for a growing *consilience* that causal explanations across disciplines may contribute to new understanding and knowledge that will be needed to cope with the challenges of the 'international risk society' (Beck 1992, 1999, 2007).

All authors of this and subsequent volume were specifically invited by the lead editor in consultation with John Grin and Czesaw Mesjasz to contribute to three workshops on reconceptualizing security at the:

- *45th Annual ISA Convention* in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 17–20 March 2004[5];
- *20th IPRA Conference* in Sopron, Hungary, 5–9 July 2004[6];
- *Fifth Pan-European Conference on International Relations* (ECPR) in The Hague, the Netherlands, 8–11 September 2004.[7]

At these workshops all papers were critiqued by discussants and by the audience. All chapters in this volume have been peer reviewed by at least two anonymous reviewers, and subsequently all chapters in this volume have been revised by the authors.

This book is not addressed *only* to the political science, international relations, strategic studies, peace research, development, and environmental studies community in the OECD world. Its scope is broader and more ambitious. It intends to broaden the scope and to sensitize the reader to the thinking in different disciplines, cultures, and global regions, especially on nature and humankind. The editors have worked hard that these three related books on 'reconceptualizing security' will be of relevance for scholars, educators and students and the more generally academically trained audience in many scientific disciplines, such as: *political science* (international relations, security studies, environmental studies, peace research, conflict and war studies); *sociology* (security conceptualization and risk society); *economics* (globalization and security); *philosophy, theology, comparative religion* and *culture* (security conceptualization); *international law* (security conceptualization), *geosciences* (global environmental change, climate change, desertification, water), *geography* (global environmental change, population, urbanization, food); *military science* (military academies).

The global thinking on security is also of importance for policymakers and their advisers on the national and international level in: a) foreign, defence, development, and environment ministries and their policy-oriented think tanks; b) international organizations: NATO, European institutions, UN, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, UNDP, UNEP, IEA, UNU, et al.; c) for the *Human Security Network*; d) for the environment and security network of the representatives of 27 EU foreign ministries; and in e) nongovernmental organizations in the areas of foreign and defence, development and environment policies; as well as for f) diverse social and indigenous movements. The thinking on security and on the specific security policies of countries, alliances, and international organizations are also a special focus for educators (at all levels) and media specialists.

5 See the presentations at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/download_isa.html>.

6 See the presentations at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/download_sopron.html>.

7 See the presentations at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/the_hague_programme.html>.

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