

**Tobias Debiel,**  
**Executive Director, Institute for Development and Peace,**  
**Univ. of Duisburg, Germany**

**Extended vs. Human Security:  
The Need for an Integrated Security Concept for  
Development, Foreign, and Security Policy**

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Security is one of the constitutive concepts of peace and security studies, one that has also been taken up and further developed by the field of development studies since the mid-1990s. Up to and far into the 1980s, security thinking both in the "strategic community" and in the multilateralism-oriented field of peace and conflict research was dominated by a state-centered security concept focussing primarily on external threats to national security posed by military factors. The end of the East-West conflict shifted the focus to multidimensional, often internally motivated conflict constellations, and the result was a broad consensus on the outdatetness of traditional security concepts. However, the new concepts of "extended" (IISS 1996), "comprehensive/global" (Commission on Global Governance 1995), or "human" (UNDP 1994) security often lacked analytical finesse, tending more to take cognizance of new threats, new scopes for external actors, and new security needs at the societal and individual level, and to append them to existing, traditional security concepts in an additive approach. This is a somewhat surprising development in view of the fact that in the early 1990s publications by Buzan (1991) and Waever et al. (1993) opened up a convincing new approach to an altered concept of security. These studies widen the traditional state security approach by enlarging it to embrace the complementary concept of societal security.

This constitutes, among other things, a fruitful point of departure for defining longer-term conditions required for peace in multiethnic states that are faced with virulent autonomy- or secession-related conflicts. The present paper develops on this basis an integral understanding of

"national-societal security" which includes both internal and external threats to states and threats faced by major societal groups. This approach does not view "global problems" per se as threats to security and focuses instead on the highly divergent levels of adaptability of governmental and societal systems in various countries and regions. And above all it stresses the often underestimated significance of the (sub)regional context for national-societal security. The reason is that the conflict dynamics in "porous" or "fragmenting" states are as a rule played out in a subregional "security complex."

## **1. The outdatedness of the traditional concept of state security**

The concept of security in international relations up to the end of the 1980s was in essence a product of the realist school. The concept was given its classic formulation in 1943 by Walter Lippman. According to Lippman (1943: 51), a state is "secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war." Such "core values" include in particular a country's territorial integrity, political independence, and its viability as well as its ability to safeguard the existence of its citizens. In the end, this state-centered security concept rests on two basic premises: first, that most threats come from the outside, and second, that these threats are primarily of a military nature, and thus, as a rule, call for a military response (Ayooob 1995: 5).

The traditional notion of state security has two conceptual weaknesses. First, it is based primarily on the type of conflict occurring between states in continental Europe since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. One particularly problematic assumption is that of consolidated statehood, since the security problems faced by the Third World are largely bound up with processes of state-building (Ayooob 1995: 21). This process is generally confined to an internal debate on the legitimacy of the ruling regime, since ruling elites generally tend to secure their power by repression rather than by provision of political and socioeconomic services which could foster social integration and stability (Azar/Moon 1988: 77-101).

Second, the traditional concepts are based on the assumption that individual states are comparatively invulnerable to the emergence of crises in neighboring or strategically important regions. As early as 1974 Joseph S. Nye pointed out a broadening of threat factors: "Economic issues have risen in importance on the agendas of world politics. In such a world, the composition of threats to states has become more subtle and more complex. 'Security' is more than a military matter." Since the early 1990s a multiplicity of studies has dealt in detail with the altered nature of security. Both "strategic studies", a field close to the realist school, and multilateralists have recognized the need for a multidimensional security concept. While the strategic community prefers the term "extended

security” (which tends to stress threats for Western countries and the applicability of military means), the multilateralists refer to the concepts of “comprehensive” and “human security”.

## **2. Extended security: Broadening the range of threat perceptions**

In the 1990s the security establishment gradually turned away from a concept which viewed security almost exclusively in terms of the East-West conflict. One crucial change in the strategic community's discourse is the growing attention it accords to domestic factors in analyzing the overall security situation. Today it is difficult to uphold the criticism commonly leveled at the realist school that it fails to consider the internal makeup of states. At least as far as concrete strategic analyses are concerned, the "billiard ball model" of international relations, in which states are viewed as clearly demarcated, impenetrable, hard-shelled entities, is no longer tenable. The shells are now seen as fragile. The demarcations of national entities can today perhaps be better defined as permeable skins that permit exchanges between internal and external affairs.

The German Defense Ministry's White Paper, e.g., pleaded in 1994 for a new view on security: "Risk analyses [...] must not be restricted to Europe but must take into consideration the interdependence of regional and global developments. They must include social, economic, and ecological tendencies and place them in relation to the security of Germany and its allies." (BMVg 1994, para. 214; translation by T.D.) The Defense Policy Guidelines of May 2003 go even further. Not only do they provide a more precise definition of the dimensions of extended security, they furthermore focus far less on the national boundaries that had until then confined the concept of defense, and they deal at length with military capabilities needed to respond to the new challenges.

One of the constitutive aspects of the strategic community's altered concept of security is the fact that the concept has been extended at two levels – both in substantive and operational terms. At the substantive level, the concept now includes the manifold causes of conflict, and the notions of stability and interest have been both modified to take interdependencies into account and expanded in geographic terms. In addition to the "hard" facts of economic disintegration and ecological crisis, human rights violations in the world's crisis regions have increasingly, and explicitly, come to be seen as relevant to security, since such violations may generate domestic or regional instability and, seen from a global perspective, may also affect the strategic interests of other states. At the operational level, it is at the same time suggested that a response to these new problems calls for an expansion of the scope of potential military operations, with a military crisis reaction potential becoming an integral element of "a cause-oriented policy of crisis and conflict resolution." (BMVg 1994: para. 254; translation by T.D.)

### **3. Comprehensive and human security: Putting global concerns and the individual first**

The aspect of the concrete multidimensionality of security has its origins less in the "strategic community" itself than in peace studies and the multilateral orientation typical of the 1960s and 1970s. In view of the heightened threat potential posed by nuclear confrontation, the primary focus in the 1980s was on the East-West conflict. The concept of "common security," advanced by the Palme Commission (1982) and influenced by the thinking of Egon Bahr, presented an alternative to the confrontational attitude toward the nuclear threat and aimed to span a broad net of confidence- and security-building measures.

Since the mid-1990s, a return to a "comprehensive security concept" can be observed among multilateralists in which "questions of economy, ecology, demography, communication, and the development of civilization and technology" (Rotfeld 1995: 10) are assuming growing importance, a concept which includes "not only direct military threats to territorial integrity but also economic and stability risks such as the debt problematic, global ecological problems like climate change, and threats to political stability - such as terrorism" (Dicke 1994:14, translated by T.D.). One major reason for this shift is a development policy which has become progressively more sensitive to phenomena of collective violence and which increasingly involves discussions on concepts of "global security" (UNDP 1994: 30).

Against this background, both the Commission on Global Governance and UNDP, the United Nations Development Programme, have called for a broadening of the traditional concentration on state security to embrace the dimensions of human security and the security of the planet. The concept "human security" recognizes that global security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests to include the protection of people (Commission on Global Governance 1995), whereby extreme economic or social need, disease, systematic crime, and massive oppression may all constitute central threats to security. Ken Booth and Peter Vale (1995: 296-297), for example, have argued that scarcity of food and water, poverty, unemployment, drug and arms trafficking, corruption, migration, etc. have become the central threats to individual security in Southern Africa. In contrast to the "extended security concept" of strategic studies, this approach is not only extended horizontally but also deepened vertically to the extent that subnational actors (social groups, individuals) here enter the stage as subjects with a need for protective "security." Ken Booth and Peter Vale (1995: 293) see this as a basic shift in perspective which, instead of viewing states as the primary object of security considerations, places the focus on the state's function as a means to human security.

Most recently, a report titled "Human Security Now" was published by the "Commission on Human Security" (2003), headed by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Prof.

Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in economic science. The idea for this report grew out of the UN Millennium Summit which focused on securing “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. In this context, human security means “protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities for making informed choices and acting on their own behalf” (Ogata/Cels 2003: 274). A core concept is that of “vital freedoms” which refers to “the inalienable fundamental rights and freedoms that are laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments” (Ogata/Cels 2003: 274). Besides defining the conceptual framework, the Commission’s report “concentrates on a number of distinct but interrelated issues concerning conflict and poverty: protecting people in conflict and post-conflict situations, shielding people forced to move; overcoming economic insecurities, guaranteeing essential health care, and ensuring universal education. In its report, the Commission formulates recommendations and follow-up activities.” (see <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org>)

The concept of human security is innovative and, from a normative perspective, well-founded. At the same time, though, several points of criticism have been raised (for an overview, see Paris 2001). A thought-provoking and fundamental critique directed at the multilateralist “broadeners” of security concepts has been put forward by Yuen Foong Khong (2001). He identifies “three major pitfalls of well-intentioned attempts to ‘securitize’ the individual human being”: First of all, according to Yuen Foong Khong, putting the security of every individual on the agenda may lead to the “(total) paralysis of our ability to prioritize”. Secondly, the overstretched moral claim to intervene and act on behalf of all victims of oppression may give rise to false hopes. And thirdly, Yuen Foong Khong criticizes the false causal assumption that international peace and security are always directly linked to the safety of each and every person.

#### **4. Extended vs. human security? Common ground and differences**

How are “extended” and “comprehensive/human security” related to each other? Both approaches are characterized by a number of conceptual and thematic overlaps. E.g., they do justice to the Janus-faced globalization process, which is casting an increasingly doubtful light on classic ways of thinking and acting in terms of state sovereignty and put issues like transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental pollution and migration. The paths taken by the security establishment on the one hand and development policy makers/multilateralists on the other diverge, however, when it comes to the precise goal of the analysis and the political conclusions inferred from it. The strategic community aims primarily to protect the immediate security interests of the West in a world

of turbulence and transition. And these interests are jeopardized less by civil wars or humanitarian disasters per se than by their transnational impacts and their potential spillovers onto a level involving potential regional or great-power conflicts. The aim is thus not to provide support for conflict-torn societies in every case of serious human rights violations. Indeed, in view of the risks inherent in long-term involvement in these countries' conflicts, such support is viewed with skepticism. It appears more important to focus on stabilizing the relations between great powers, containing regional conflicts (possibly even unilaterally), and combating transnational dangers.

Development policy makers and multilateralists are thinking less of expanding the functions of the military when they conduct multidimensional analyses of new security risks. Indeed, their aim is to mobilize worldwide support for the fight against underdevelopment and war as well as for protection in cases of human rights violations (in extreme cases, even by military means). The focus here is on strengthening civil mechanisms of conflict resolution, an objective which finds expression in improved early warning, preventive diplomacy, and further development of international jurisdiction. The concept of post-conflict peace-building first introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali furthermore (1992) stresses that armed conflicts can only be resolved in the long term if the international community is consistent in its efforts aimed at demobilization, reintegration of combatants and refugees, socioeconomic reconstruction, and creation of structures compatible with the rule of law.

## **5. Towards an integrated concept of security (1): Introducing societal security**

Despite for their achievements and their policy-relevance, extended and comprehensive/human security, from an analytic perspective, are characterized by a couple of flaws. Both concepts appear remarkably unfocused as soon as they are applied to the domestic conflict constellations which are so extraordinarily relevant for peace and security policy. These constellations are not assessed on the basis of a specific concept of societal security but are primarily viewed in a rather loose relation to global factors or individual security threats. True, societal developments are mentioned by the "broadeners", but they are frequently labeled as "ethnic" or "religious conflicts," terms which are of only limited usefulness, and tend to be simply added to the existing list of complexes at the root of such conflicts.

In other words, the "extended" as well as the "comprehensive/human security" concept remains too unfocused in analytical terms to grasp issue potentially violent conflict in unconsolidated states. Against this background it would appear more useful to focus on core issues than to place emphasis on an expansion of the security dimension. As

Mohammed Ayoob (1995: 8-12) rightly notes, the state continues to be at the center of the security question. The consolidated state may function as a guarantor of security and the rule of law, but on the other hand the state constitutes one of the main causes of violence, both internal and external. It is precisely this ambivalence which shows that the state is the key focal point involved in reaching any understanding of security. Still, not even a modified concept of state security is sufficiently far-reaching, since social collectives capable of inciting violent action are also constituted at the subnational level. Civil wars, above all ethno-national and ethno-political conflicts, cannot be explained solely with reference to state institutions; their causes must also be sought in threats to the core values (security, political, social and economic participation, identity) held by major societal groups.

It is for this reason that I consider the concept "societal security" a central one. In so doing I base my arguments on a concept presented at the beginning of the 1990s by researchers of the European Security Group at the Centre for Peace (Waever et al. 1993). The starting point of this concept is the issue of the identity of societies in turbulent settings. According to Waever (1993: 19), societal security concerns the ability of a society to maintain its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual risks.

A concept of societal security constructed in this way must be seen as complementary to, and not as a replacement for, the model of national security, the substance of which is the survival and sovereignty of the state. Both concepts emphasize an element constitutive for the survival for the unit under analysis: while states are concerned with protecting their sovereignty, societies define themselves through identity. One major advantage of the societal security approach is that it provides a substantive theoretical background which enables it to relate the significance of ethno-national and religious, as well as political, ideological, and socioeconomic identities, to the formation of social cohesion or, depending on the case, to the collapse of social structures.

## **6. Towards an integrated concept of security (2): How to include the global and the (sub)regional dimension**

Apart from including "societal security" as an interim level between national/state and human security, further differentiation is also called for at the international level. Both national and societal security are, first and foremost, tied into a regional context, a "security complex" (Buzan 1991; Waever et al. 1993) which is concerned less with the survival of the planet than with more concrete issues of migration and flight, reciprocal stabilization and destabilization, economic exchange and competition. In short, as commendable as the "extended" and "comprehensive/human security" concepts may be, they run the risk of being unable to pay



adequate attention to the analyses of the reality of "regionalized civil conflict."

Global changes and challenges, in this framework, are regarded as relevant to security only when they are given a political dimension and impinge on "security hardware," "regime security," or "societal security." Ayooob graphically formulates this approach when he writes: "In other words, debt burdens, rain-forest decimation, or even famine do not become part of the security calculus for our purpose unless they threaten to have political outcomes that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics." (Ayooob 1995: 9)

Depending on the regional focus, the global setting is marked by different phenomena and threats. Hence, in a sense, we live in a "world risk society" (Beck 1999). Yet, just as in the case of a national "risk society" (Beck 1992), the status of societies determines to a large degree the potential risk presented by ubiquitous threats. Thus transnational crime and terrorism may very well give rise to security threats in consolidated and established industrial societies of the North. What is more, global spillover effects may be anticipated in countries where labor migration or colonial ties have created a strong diaspora in which extortion of protection money, drug and arms trafficking, etc. contribute to transferring conflicts to the territory of a host or new home country. The major threat to industrialized nations, however, is posed by instability in neighboring crisis regions, and here in particular by the resulting movements of refugees.

Peripheral states of the South, however, are generally considerably more vulnerable. Global changes may have direct impacts on "security hardware" or "regime security," since these fragile societies and states are not in a position to deal adequately with external shocks (such as world economic recession) or ecological stress. Global governance measures may improve this adaptability or lessening the impacts of external shocks. It is, however, a significant fact that certain forms of global governance may also have negative impacts on national and societal security. For instance, the impacts of structural adjustment programs pursued under external pressure starting in 1980 have resulted in disintegrative social processes in numerous African countries. In addition, in the early 1990s external pressure to embark on democratization processes posed an immediate threat to the "regime security" of ruling elites.

As a rule, the primary action context of national security policy is determined by a country's close regional embeddedness. The internal structure of such regional subsystems may be marked by both mutual destabilization and constructive integration. The neofunctionalist concept of the "pluralistic security community" (Deutsch et al. 1957) continues to define the direction of this second model. Institutionalism has shown that, in addition to such integration processes, regimes can also contribute to the reliability of peaceful cooperation.

However, regional security also presupposes an ability on the part of regional actors to deal effectively with changes in the global setting and to develop a certain degree of autonomy in relations with extraregional actors. Crisis regions like the African continent or Central and South Asia, in particular, tend to be highly sensitive – Nye/Keohane would speak of asymmetric vulnerability – with respect to global factors. It is for this reason imperative, in an analysis of crisis regions, to view domestic and inter-national conflicts consistently in their relation to the structure and developments of the respective regional subsystems. Refugees play a major role in the regionalization of political violence. Regional streams of refugees may lead to situations in which almost all dimensions of the security problematic are involved, both in target countries and in countries of origin: "security hardware", the outward "regime security" of ruling elites, and "societal security," which may be endangered by competition for resources as well as by crime and arms and drug trafficking.

## **7. Conclusion**

The concept of security developed here does more than simply "extend" the substantive dimension of security or adopt a "comprehensive" understanding of the need for protection. Over and above this, it seeks to focus more closely on the multifaceted and mutually interdependent relationship between societal and national security. Second, it has chosen the regional "conflict system" as the central frame of reference for conflict dynamics in crisis regions. Finally, the present paper takes account of the altered global setting, even though the latter can, in the nonmilitary sphere, become a security-relevant factor only in its relation to the adaptability and the internal stability of state and societal systems.

An integrated security concept of this kind serves to enhance the traditional understanding of state security by integrating a social dimension in it as well. Threats to individual security ("human security") have a place here as well, provided that they are seen in direct relation to the security threats faced by major societal groups. By integrating the various levels of social action in this way, it is possible to escape the trap set by the temptation to simply additively juxtapose the items on a growing list of security dimensions. While it is true that the increasing interrelatedness of socioeconomic, political-ideological, ecological, and geostrategic causes of conflict calls for an "extended" or "multidimensional" security concept, it is essential for any such extension to focus on the issue of systematic violence perpetrated by collective actors, if the concept of security is not to "blur" and distract the discussion from the matter at hand.

It is quite likely that the "integrated concept of security" will also prove able to transform the bogged-down controversy over a "negative" or "positive" concept of peace (Galtung 1969). The minimalist concept of peace, i.e. the absence of war, is not comprehensive enough either to grasp internal violence or to sufficiently take into consideration the need for continuous

efforts aimed at nonviolent conflict resolution. On the other hand, the maximalist concept of peace, which in addition calls for social justice and the self-realization of the individual personality, tends to overburden the concept of peace without paying adequate attention to the crucial substantive element of the concept of peace, the function of pacification (Münkler 1985). For in essence, peace is the absence of organized and armed violence at all levels of human community. This definition includes not only organized military conflicts within or between states but also systematic repression of populations by a terrorist state machinery, by "war lords" or Mafia-like groups, be it at the regional or global level, not to forget the actions of mercenary armies, terrorist groups, and secret services.

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## The author

Dr. Tobias Debiel, Senior Researcher, Head of Research Group "Governance and Conflict", Department of Political and Cultural Change, Center for Development Research / Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF), Walter-Flex-Str. 3, D-53113 Bonn  
Tel. (+49-228) 73-4909, 73-1971, Fax (+49-228) 73-1972  
E-Mail: tobias.debiel@uni-bonn.de

*Main Research Fields:* Crisis Prevention as a leitmotif for Development and Foreign Policy; Global Governance und World Peace Order; UN Peace Operations; State Formation and Violent Conflict; The Contribution of Democratic Institutions to Non-Violent Conflict Resolution; Structural Stability and Human Security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

*Selected Publications* (in english): (Ed. with Axel Klein) *Fragile Peace. State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions*. London: ZED Books 2002; *Strengthening the UN As an Effective World Authority: Cooperative Security Versus Hegemonic Crisis Management*, in: *Global Governance, A Review of Multilateralism and International Organization*, Boulder (Co.), Vol. 6 (January-March 2000) No. 1, pp. 25-41 (Lynne Rienner Publishers in cooperation with ACUNS and the United Nations University); (with Martina Fischer) *Crisis Prevention & Conflict Management by the European Union: Concepts, Capacities and Problems of Coherence*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (Berghof Report No. 4: September 2000); *Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Intervention: The Imperatives and Pitfalls in a Turbulent World*, in: *State and Law, A Biannual Collection of Recent German Contributions to these Fields*, Tübingen (Institute for Scientific Co-operation), Vol. 55 (1997), p. 51-65; *War*, in: Ingomar Hauchler/Paul M. Kennedy (Eds.), *Global Trends. The World Almanac of Development and Peace*. New York: Continuum 1994, pp. 177-197.