PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch
Free University of Berlin, Berlin, AFES-PRESS, Chairman, Mosbach

The Three Worldviews of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant
Foundations of modern thinking on peace and security
Contextual Change and Reconceptualisation of Security

1. The English School: Three worldviews on international relations

The international political reality and the threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks for peace and security we perceive depend on our worldview, our conceptual models and theoretical concepts but also on our mindsets that are influenced by our traditions, experience and by the media that select the facts and interpret the images of the world that constitute reality for us. Thus, both the scientific concepts we use and the reality we perceive through our conceptual lenses and we interpret with our concepts, models and theories are socially constructed.

Martin Wight has distinguished among three traditions or worldviews of the

a) Machiavellian or Hobbesian pessimists for whom power is crucial,

b) The Grotian pragmatists or rationalists for whom cooperation matters, and

c) The Kantian optimists for whom ideas and legal principles are vital.

I have argued that the theoretical debates in international relations can be reduced to these three basic worldviews that have reappeared in the four debates since international relations emerged as a scientific discipline in 1919. My goal is twofold:

a) to review these three ideal-type worldviews associated with Hobbes, Grotius and Kant;

b) and to address the interdependence between fundamental contextual and scientific changes and conceptual innovation both in the social sciences and in the body politic.

The basic question behind our project is whether fundamental challenges to the existing international order triggered conceptual innovations. My object are the three worldviews, and of the whole project the changes in the security concept that have been triggered by 11-9 or 9-11.

2. Three Worldviews, Contextual Change and Conceptual Innovation

Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant were universal scholars who have made scientific contributions to the natural sciences, to philosophy, the evolution of law but also to history and the arts. Hobbes (1588-1676) and Grotius (1583-1645) were contemporaries.
They lived during a major turning point of European scientific and intellectual history when Galilei and Kepler, Bacon and Descartes developed new scientific horizons. Both were victims of major wars, Hobbes of the civil war in England, and Grotius of the 30 year’s war in Europe. Kant (1724-1804) saw the changes triggered by the French Revolution, and of the period of enlightenment, as well as of the Prussian and Napoleonic wars.

My thesis is that both the fundamental political change and new scientific paradigms have influenced their thinking on issues of peace and security, on war as well as on national and international order. This dual contextual change (of order) and of basic patterns of philosophical and scientific thinking contributed to conceptual innovations that are still relevant for international relations. It is assumed that the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 has triggered a fundamental global change, and the basic question of our project is whether the change in international order was instrumental for a reconceptualisation of security.

Many events in Europe since 1980 that resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall were instrumental for the fourth major turn in European and global history since 1789. It was not triggered by revolutions and not by wars, that resulted in the international orders of Vienna, Versailles, and Yalta. While this fourth turn was the first peaceful global change in human history, the aftermath was not. The wars in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union resulted in a process of fragmentation and dissolution, and the turn contributed to “failed states”, e.g. in Somalia. Intelligence specialists and scholars of different worldviews did not foresee this major peaceful change in global and regional orders. They also misdiagnosed several violent consequences.

But before I deal with the recent past and presence, let me get back to the impact of contextual change and conceptual innovation had on the founding fathers of the three worldviews.

3. Thomas Hobbes and the Emergence of the Realist Worldview

Thomas Hobbes lived in France and Italy where he met René Descartes and Galileo Galilei in 1636. Prior to the revolution in England he returned to Paris in 1640 where he stayed until 1651 when he returned under the rule of Cromwell. His philosophy was influenced by the civil and revolutionary wars he witnessed both in England and France.

Hobbes wrote his major books of political philosophy between 1640 and 1651 in Paris. During his exile he published an augmented version of De Cive in 1647, in 1650 he released The Elements of Law with its two parts on human nature and on the body politic, and in 1651 he published: Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. He based a permanent domestic peace on truth and discussed the possibility of peace.
Hobbes offered a dichotomy of the ‘state of nature’ (anarchy) where a war of all against all and where a strive to power prevailed with a state of the society where the sovereign’s task was to control anarchy by maintaining the peace with force. In the ‘state of nature’, “civilized life would be impossible, and any life risky”. This required “an agreement or contract, a concerted act by which they all renounced their rights of nature at the same time” whereby the task of the sovereign is to provide security to its citizens, and to prevent war of all against all.

In the second part, Hobbes outlines a theory of cooperation based on contract, sovereignty and representation. The only reason for self-preservation was the will of those living in a commonwealth to survive. Therefore the power of all citizens had to be transferred to one single sovereign or a collective body that combines their will. A good relationship between the sovereign and his people was indispensable to demonstrate its power towards others. Hobbes believed that an external enemy who unites a society was a precondition for a lasting and stable community. The main features of a Hobbesian state have been: absolute sovereignty of a strong central authority and a sharp demarcation to the outside world.

4. The Realist Worldview and the Dominant Mindset of Policy-makers

After World War I, Hobbesian ideas influenced the foreign policy elites in Germany, Italy, Japan and in the Soviet Union. After Versailles, in Germany political geography and geopolitics and the authoritarian realism of Carl Schmidt had a major impact on the Nazi elite. During the Mussolini period in Italy the German geopolitics school was widely read. In Japan, since the Meiji restauration of 1868, a modern Hobbesian state was set up, and with the Showa restauration in the 1920s, geopolitical and expansionist considerations emerged. Since the October Revolution of 1917 until Gorbachev’s election in March 1985, Hobbesian concepts had influenced the foreign policy of the USSR and of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

In contrast, during the first phase of international relations (1919-1939) in the U.K. and in the U.S. the focus was on international organisations, forms of cooperation, and disarmament – primarily influenced by Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. With the collapse of the League of Nations, this worldview was challenged in the UK by Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982) and in the U.S. by Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, and Henry A. Kissinger.

After 1945 Hans Morgenthau became the leading proponent of the power-oriented realism in international affairs. In his Scientific Man versus Power Politics he saw in “the unending struggle for survival and power” the key feature of international politics. With his Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace he laid the basis for the realist thinking in the U.S. during the Cold War. He outlined his “realist theory of International Relations” with the goal to bring order and meaning into many unconnected phenomena. Morgenthau’s theory is organised “around the two concepts of power and
peace”. He focused on international politics as a struggle for power, national power, and on limits of national power. Three parts focus on peace through limitation, transformation and accommodation.

In 1959 Kenneth Waltz examined in *Men, the State and War* the causes of war and the possibilities of peace. In 1979 in his *Theory of International Relations*, Waltz developed this idea further with three aims: a) to examine and critique existing theories, b) to construct a theory “that remedies the defects of present theories”, and c) to “examine some applications of the theory constructed”. For Waltz, international political systems require a structure that are “defined in terms of the primary political units of an era”, and that emerge from the coexistence of states. For states the survival motive is crucial and a “prerequisite to achieving any goals states may have”, and also a “ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured”. In a next step he compared between behaviour and outcome in an *anarchic* international system and *hierarchic* national systems. While “power does not bring control”, it “provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others wield” and “greater power permits wider ranges of action”. Waltz argues “the more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how”. While great powers can afford not to learn, weak states cannot.

After Carr, Niebuhr, Morgenthau and George Kennan representing the first generation of realist scholars, and the neorealists Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin the second, in the 1990s, a third generation has emerged with John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, and others. These many realist and structural realist or neo-realist theories have focused primarily on the classical “peace and security” linkage where the “environment” does not matter and thus, new global environmental challenges are not yet perceived as global policy issues. This mainstream realist thinking was challenged by peace research since the 1950s. This challenge was based on the two other traditions or worldviews, influenced by Grotius and Kant.

5. Hugo Grotius: Miracle of Holland and Father of International Law

In the late 15th century, with the decline of the North Italian trading cities, the discovery of America, the centre of politics and trade moved to Spain and Portugal, Holland and England. With the reformation of Luther, the Copernican revolution, the emergence of humanist thinking and the Renaissance, the medieval Christian worldview gradually eroded, and the old legal order collapsed. In 1581 the Netherlands declared their independence from Spain. With the insolvency of Philip II, Amsterdam became a European centre of trade and banking. In 1602, the United East-Indian Company was set up and in 1619 Jakarta was founded.
In this time of transition to a new order of sovereign states, Hugo de Groot was born in 1583 as the son of the mayor of Delft and the curator of Leiden university. At the age of eight, he wrote Latin elegies, with 11 he studied letters at Leiden and with 15 he obtained a doctorate in law. In 1598 he studied law in Orléans and in 1599 he returned to The Hague as an advocate. In 1601 he was appointed as the official Latin historiographer of the Dutch republic’s revolt.

In 1604 he wrote on the law of prize and booty: A chapter on ‘Mare Liberum’ was published in 1609. In 1607 he was appointed attorney general of Holland. In 1613 he negotiated a settlement of trade disputes with James I of England. He became deeply involved in a religious dispute between the province of Holland and the Calvinist States General of the Netherlands. When the latter prevailed, Prince Maurice ordered his arrest and Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1621 he escaped to Paris. After the death of Prince Maurice he returned home in 1631 but after he was threatened with arrest in 1632 he went to Hamburg and in 1634 to Paris as the Swedish ambassador. In 1644 Queen Cristina invited him to Sweden to become a member of the Swedish Council of State. On his return to Paris he was shipwrecked and died two days later in Rostock in 1645. Grotius wrote poetry, drama, and edited classic Greek and Latin writers, as well as on astronomy, contemporary history, and on international law.

He published his major book on the law of war and peace in 1625 in Paris. Contrary to Hobbes, Grotius argued “that states are not engaged in a simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts by common rules and institutions”. But he accepted the Hobbesian premise “that sovereign states, rather than individual human beings, are the principal actors in international politics”. Grotius insisted “that nations are bound by natural law, which he considered independent of God and based on man’s own nature”. He based the establishment of society on the law of nature, but he disagreed with Machiavelli that war could not be reconciled with law. While each state should have a right at war (ius ad bellum) the use of force should adhere to the principle of proportionality (ius in bello). He established modern international law as a legal order based on sovereignty, equality and mutuality of states.

6. Hugo Grotius and his Impact on International Law and Relations

Grotius wanted to create a theoretical foundation for a law of war and to develop rules for nations and individuals. For him “a resort to violence was a trait of nonrational creatures” and “he saw violent practices as the inevitable result of evil which negated the sociability of men”. But he also validated war “as a tool for fulfilling the natural purposes of men”.

In his view “force was allowable to maintain legitimate rights, and as such it was not irreconcilable with law”. If correctly used, war “was an instrument of rational, civilized men and had
as its function the preservation of society. In Grotius’ view, war should only be undertaken “for the enforcement of rights” and “within the bounds of law and good faith”. But he also stressed that “authorities generally assign to wars three justifiable causes, defence, recovery of property, and punishment”. Due to the international anarchy and the lack of a superior authority force could be used “as a means for serving justice” but it had “to be moral in accordance with the laws of nature”. Grotius suggested three methods how disputes could be prevented to escalate to wars: a) by conference, b) by arbitration involving a third party, and c) by lot or single combat. In the Grotian view, international law places limits on the means of pursuing war and requires a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, ideas that are reflected in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and in modern humanitarian law.

Grotius’ work had a lasting impact on both international law and international relations. In 1983, four hundred years after his birth, it still provoked controversial debates on its relevance for the presence and future. I will only briefly review the comments by Falk, Röling and Bull.

Richard A. Falk argued that Grotius provided “a new normative order in international society that acknowledges the realities of an emergent state system while remaining faithful to the shared heritage of spiritual, moral, and legal ideas that any Christian society could still be presumed to affirm as valid”. Falk stated that the Grotian quest remains important “because it is both normatively grounded and future-oriented, synthesizes old and new while it cherishes continuities and legitimizes discontinuities“.

For Bert Röling, Grotius’ doctrine on just war “has not only become obsolete, but outright dangerous”. Positive law as the product of interests, power positions, and prevailing values had to be changed once the poor and developing countries formed a majority in the world legal community. But Grotius remained an inspiring figure “who did much to develop a modern international law suitable to meet the needs of the new nation-states which had ari-sen on the ruins of the medieval world”.

For Hedley Bull Grotius’ work “is one of the great landmarks in modern thinking about international relations.” In his *The Anarchical Society* Bull claimed that Grotian perspectives focus on organisations, regimes, networks of co-operation and integration. He argued:

The Grotian tradition describes international politics in terms of a society of states or international society. … The Grotians contend that states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions. … The Grotians accept the Hobbesian premise that sovereigns or states are the principal reality in international politics; the immediate members of international society are states rather than individual human beings. International politics … expresses neither complete conflict of interest between states nor complete identity of interest. …
In the Grotian view states are bound by rules of prudence and by morality and law. These imperatives require coexistence and co-operation in a society of states. From this perspective co-operation matters. Bull argued that Grotius’ work is cardinal for international relations:

because it states one of the classic paradigms that have since determined both our understanding of the facts of inter-state relations and our ideas as to what constitutes right conduct therein. …

Grotius advanced the third position, that states and the rulers of states in their dealings with one another were bound by rules and together formed a society. … Even without central institutions, rules and peoples might constitute a society among themselves, an anarchical society or society without government. … It is this idea which … provides the core of what we may call the Grotian tradition. Grotius most propagated the idea of international society that “was given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia. Grotius may be considered the intellectual father of the first general peace settlement of modern times”. This peace did “not mark the beginning of the modern international system or states system” but rather “of an international society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and of a common interest in maintaining them”.

While Grotius’ concept of such universal international society was a theoretical and normative one, in the 20th century this concept had become political and economic reality. For Bull:

The importance of Grotius lies in the part he played in establishing the idea of international society. … By raising the most fundamental questions about modern international relations, by assembling all the best that has been thought …, and by providing us with a systematic exposition of his own … conception of international society, Grotius [is] one of the master theorists of the subject.

Both Wight and Bull defined the Grotian tradition “as the via media between the Machiavellian and Kantian positions”. Kingsbury and Roberts remained sceptical “that the literature and practice … is sufficiently unified to constitute a ‘Grotian tradition’”. I use Grotius as an “ideal type” perspective of international relations. In my view, the Grotian worldview may be best suited to counter the challenges of global environmental change in multilateral institutions.

7. Immanuel Kant and his Treatise of “Eternal Peace” (1795)

The third tradition associated with Immanuel Kant was described by Wight as “revolutionist”, by Bull as “universalist”, and by myself as “optimist”. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was born in Königsberg in East Prussia where he studied theology, but his preferences were mathematics and physics. He worked as a tutor for three families and in 1755 he became a Privatdozent, in 1770 he received a chair of logic and metaphysics at Königsberg (now Kalingrad/Russia).

In his philosophical development two phases are distinguished: a pre-critical (1746-1770) period, and - a critical period (1781-1804) when he published his three critiques. Later, he wrote on politics and religion, on Eternal Peace, and on the conflicts of the faculties.
In 1793 in an essay Kant developed his ideas on theory and practice in morality, constitutional and international right from a cosmopolitical perspective. With regard to the means, Kant argued that the “result depends not so much on what we do … nor on what method we adopt to bring it about” but “in what human nature does in and with us as to compel us onto a path that we ourselves would not readily follow”.

As with the advancing culture of nations wars will continue, so their costs will grow. He argues that in the end “every nation must be so organised internally that … the people who pay for it have the decisive voice as to whether or not there should be war”. In this democratic system of rule, “succeeding generations … will be able … to make ever more progress towards bettering themselves”. Kant concludes that given the insecurity in an anarchic system and the high costs for “the preparation of defence that often makes peace more oppressive and destructive of internal welfare than even war can never be relaxed” the only remedy is a state “of international [law] … based on public laws backed by peace brought about by a so-called balance of power in Europe is a mere figment of imagination”. Kant places his trust:

In the theory about what the relation among men and nations ought to be that derives from the principle of right and that recommends to the earthly gods the maxim always so to proceed in their conflicts that such a universal cosmopolitan nation will thereby be introduced, and thus to assume that it is possible (in praxi) and that it can exist. At the same time I also trust … in the nature of all things to compel man to go where he would prefer not to.

In his Perpetual Peace Kant (1795) developed these ideas further. His three key questions: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope for? lead him to a philosophy with a cosmopolitan intention in which he combined human egotism with state order. Kant went beyond the classical concept of a limited peace between wars by integrating existing traditions that aimed at an enduring peace. Its structure follows the model of many peace treaties: with a preamble, six preliminary articles, three definitive articles, a secret article and an appendix.

In the first preliminary article he criticises the traditional raison d’état of the princes. The second reflects a central idea of the enlightenment era on the self-determination of the individual and the foundation of internal and eternal peace. The third foresaw Herz’ security dilemma. The fourth prohibits to get indebted, the fifth foresaw the prohibition of interventions into the internal affairs of other countries, and the sixth forbade perfidy in ius in bello.

In his three definitive articles, Kant foresaw three basic elements of: democracy (“1. The civil constitution of every state should be republican”); league of nations (“2. The right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states”), and (human) rights to visit (“3. Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality”). In the first supplement, he re-
reflects on the role of *nature* guaranteeing perpetual peace while the second supplement contains a “secret article for perpetual peace”. Finally, in the appendix, Kant reflects “on the disagreement between morals and politics in relation to perpetual peace” as well as “on the agreement between politics and morality under the transcendental concept of public right”.

Among the many themes Kant addressed three will be briefly explored: a) His treatment of arms and security in the third preliminary article, b) his discussion of the system of rule in his first definitive article, and c) his conception of international order to maintain perpetual peace and security in his second definitive article.

The six preliminary articles outline the negative conditions of a state of peace among states and they refer to “activities … of war prevention and to the possibility of peace, and [to] pre-conditions of a legally based peace”. A specialty is the third preliminary article in which Kant postulated: “Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall be gradually abolished.” He argued:

For they constantly threaten other nations with war by giving the appearance that they are prepared for it, which goads nations into competing with one another in the number of men under arms, and this practice knows no bounds. And since the costs related to maintaining peace will in this way finally become greater than those of a short war, standing armies are the cause of wars of aggression that are intended to end burdensome expenditures.

Some scholars interpreted this article as a prohibition of military armament and arms races. others as a major critique of the absolutist state that could not survive without permanent armies. Kant saw the threat related to standing armies that caused a “security dilemma” he tried to overcome by disarmament. But Kant was no pacifist who opposed armed forces for defence. He called for a militia system for the defence of the homeland. This is a reference to the “Bill of Rights” (1776) that in Art. 13 declared “that standing armies in time of peace should be avoided as dangerous to liberty”. The militia system does not pose a threat. For Kant:

The state of peace must therefore be *established*, for the suspension of hostilities does not provide the security of peace, and unless this security is pledged by one neighbour to another …, the latter, from whom such security has been requested, can treat the former as an enemy.

This *establishment of peace* requires an active human effort on the level of the citizen and the state, of the relations among states, and of the citizen and the states. Kant tried to achieve this goal with his legal theory of peace in the three definite articles. In the second definitive article he postulates that “the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states”. To overcome the state of nature and for its own security, Kant argues “each nation can and should demand that the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guaranteeing the rights of each. This would be a federation of *nations*, but it must not be a nation consisting of nations”, thus no world state. As nations “can press for their rights only by waging war and
never in a trial before an independent tribunal”, Kant argues that war and victory cannot determine the right, and a treaty of peace “cannot end the state of war”. In Kant’s view

reason absolutely condemns war as a means of determining the right and makes seeking the state of peace a matter of unmitigated duty. But without a contract among nations peace can be neither inaugurated nor guaranteed. A league of a special sort must therefore be established, one that we can call a league of peace (foedus pacificum), which will be distinguished from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) because the latter seeks merely to stop one war, while the former seeks to end all wars forever. This league does not seek any power of the sort possessed by nations, but only the maintenance and security of nation’s own freedom, as well as that of the other nations leagued to it, without their having thereby to subject themselves to civil laws and their constraints. .. It can be shown that this idea of federalism should eventually include all nations and thus lead to perpetual peace.

Thus, for Kant republics “which by nature must be inclined to seek perpetual peace … provide a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to guarantee a state of peace among nations that is in accord with the idea of the right of nations”. Gradually such a federation “extend further and further” through several associations. This federation “is necessarily tied rationally to the concept of the right of nations. To interpret that right “as a right to go to war” is in Kant’s view “meaningless” because it serves “justly those men who are disposed to seek one another’s destruction and to find perpetual peace in the grave that covers all the horrors of violence and its perpetrators”.

For Kant international law consists of four elements: 1) states are in a state of war in their external relations with each other; 2) this natural state is a state of war; 3) a federation of states is necessary based on a societal contract; and 4) this federation may have no sovereign power.

Kants treatise on Eternal Peace inspired Wilson’s vision for the League of Nations, as well as the UN Charter. The Kantian worldview has not been applied to the analysis of global environmental change and global environment policy. However, the legally-based institutional framework for environmental regimes has emerged that deal with several challenges of global environmental change that require developing coping strategies. In 1995, many aspects of Kant’s peace theory were re-assessed by philosophers, international lawyers and specialists of international relations. Kant has influenced the peace research community.

Of special interest for international lawyers and international relations specialists has been the linkage between the first and second definitive article. The first played a major role in the debate on “democratic peace”, and the second on collective security. The first thesis has been intensively debated in the international relations community during the 1990s.
8. The Three Worldviews in the Early 21st Century

The main focus in the history of ideas was on the linkage between peace and security. The three worldviews of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant pointed to progress from Renaissance, Humanism, the Copernican revolution to the era of the French revolution and of enlightenment. The thinkers lived in periods of scientific revolutions and extreme violence and social upheaval.

Both Hobbes and Grotius were political refugees in Paris where they wrote their major books on *Leviathan* (1651) and on *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625). But their solutions differed. While Hobbes relied on the power of the sovereign, Grotius developed rules for *ius in bello* that required and acceptance of joint norms and thus required cooperation among states.

While the *Hobbesian world* was build on power, the *Grotian world* required cooperation, the *Kantian world* was based on a system of positive public law of the states to regulate political affairs internally, externally and between citizens and the state as well as between the cosmopolitan citizen and the international system. All three authors just focused on the linkage between peace and security, while the linkage between peace and the environment was outside of their focus. Their concept of nature has little in common with our thinking on the environment and ecology and are not relevant for the analysis of global environmental change.

9. Relevance of the Three Worldviews for the Twenty-first Century

Since the early 17th and the late 18th century, from the period of the Thirty-Years War and the Napoleonic wars, the international European and global context has fundamentally changed. Thus, the specific theoretical reflections, the diagnoses and remedies offered by Hobbes, Grotius and Kant have no direct application for the early 21st century. However, many basic theoretical reflections that have contributed to three ideal type perspectives in international relations, international law and philosophy remain unchanged: of *realism, pragmatism and idealism* where *power, compromise and multilateral cooperation* matter, or the *rule of law* matter.

All three worldviews focus only on the classical dyad between peace and security or on war and peace, of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the United Nations. Two new problem areas were added since the 1950s: economic and social development, and since the 1970s the environmental challenges caused by anthropogenic interventions and processes.

This “conceptual quartet” consists of the *peace and security linkage* and the two new concepts of *development* and *environment* and the four linkage concepts: a) the classical *security dilemma*, b) the new established concept of *sustainable development* linking the environment and development, c) the declaratory concept of *a sustainable peace* within the UN system, and d) my own evolving concept of a *survival dilemma* transcend the three worldviews.
10. Contextual change of 1989 and Reconceptualisation of Security?

Thus, as in the early 17th century, since 1989 and 1990 with the end of the Cold War, a dual process requires a reconceptualisation of the key concept of “security”:

a) the fundamental changes in the international political order resulted in new hard security threats, soft (environmental) security challenges, in new vulnerabilities and risks that are perceived by mind-sets of policy actors, and with models by the analyst;

b) the increasing perception of new challenges triggered by global environmental change (GEC) and processes of globalisation that may result in fatal outcomes (hazards, migration) and that escalate into political crises and violent conflicts.

The global turn of 1989/1990 overcame the bipolar world and the nuclear deterrence theories. With the Rio summit problems of climate change, biodiversity and desertification were added to the policy agenda. But the implementation strategies fell behind the declaratory politics in policy statements, such as the Agenda 21 or the Millenium goals.

It is my thesis that the different worldviews of analysts and policy makers and the specific mindsets of decision-makers and their advisers define and enforce the policy agenda. It is them who ignore or recognise the new challenges of global environmental change that cannot be solved by power with military means. The Hobbesian mindset has prevented the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Against increasing hydro-meteorological hazards no technical fix exists. They will not protect the most powerful countries, although they have better means to insure against damages, to adapt, to mitigate against and to enhance their resilience. Shifting the policy focus from military threats to new challenges of global environmental change and globalisation, requires a basic change in the prevailing mindset of policymakers and their advisers, but also of the scientific community with regard to security. This requires:

a) a continued *widening* from the Hobbesian political and military dimension of security since 1990, including economic, societal and especially environmental dimensions;

b) a continued *deepening* from the narrow *national security focus* down to other referents of securitisation from the individual to the global and interplanetary system.

This is the difficult task ahead of all of us, and this will be the common challenge for authors and editors until “our” two new books will be out and reach major libraries not only in countries that can afford this book but even more in the countries that should have access to our scientific messages that try to contribute to the precautionary principle.