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From “Security” to “Security Strategies”

a. Not as easy as it looks
b. Linkage is unclear
c. Strategy is difficult – or impossible
d. Key question: will it work? (prescription vs. description, explanation)
e. Start at end and work backwards: what works strategically?
Strategy Defined

a. A plan for matching means to ends
b. Increasing capabilities and defining and prioritizing goals
c. Adjusting to changes on either side of the means-ends equation
d. Dynamic, sophisticated plan
e. Requires the management of complex organizations
f. Multiple audiences (public, bureaucratic, allied, future legacy)
g. Multiple executors (military, national, grand, international)
Strategy is Difficult

a. Impossible to judge costs and risks ahead of time
b. Policymakers and publics are not rational
   i. Cognitive and emotional limitations
   ii. Ignorance and lack of information
c. Operational and organizational hindrances
d. Democracy works against strategy
   i. Clear preferences, calculations and consistency of choice vs. compromise and consensus-building

[Jablonsky, Betts]
Relevance to Re-conceptualizing Security

a. Targets (Effectiveness)
b. Coherence (Effectiveness)
c. Audiences (Resources): Ability to unify...
   i. Governments
   ii. Sub-national groups
   iii. International organizations
   iv. International society
Relevance to Re-conceptualizing Security

- Who makes “new” security policies? (What level?)
  - i. Individuals
  - ii. Bureaucracies
  - iii. Governments
  - iv. International Organizations
  - Transnational/Global Public

- Whose consciousness must change?
Traditional Notions of Security

a. Sovereignty, protection of citizens and territory
b. National in focus
c. State executes strategy
d. Targets: clear, persistent
e. Coherence: mixed
f. Audiences: domestic coalitions possible
Human Security

a. Rights
b. Individual/group focus
c. Identity, development
d. Targets: how clear and persistent?
e. Coherence: mixed and contingent upon normative hold
f. Audiences: are coalitions possible? National or global?

[Liotta and Rogers, eds.]
Ecological Security

a. Global sustainability and related goals
b. Ecosystem is focus
c. Global action
d. Targets: global vs. transnational vs. national
e. Coherence: high but science (information) dependent
f. Audiences: are coalitions possible?
Re-conceived Security: An Idea or a Norm?

a. Ideas
   i. Powerful but sticky
   ii. Social psychology
   iii. IR theory/ foreign policy studies

b. Norms
   i. Weber, Durkheim vs. Marx, Mannheim
   ii. Norm diffusion
   iii. Normative “staying power”
Indicators of Effective Global/Regional Strategies: Three Examples

a. Realism (Traditional security)
b. Liberalism
c. Security Communities
Realism

a. Process
   i. Leaders are concerned with relative gains
   ii. Leaders do worst-case scenario development and procure accordingly

b. Outcomes
   i. Policies aim at maximizing power and traditional conceptions of security
   ii. Cooperative acts are narrowly self-interested
Liberalism

a. **Motivating Perceptual Factors**
   
i. Evidence, and shared views, that conflicts of interest can be ameliorated through shared information
   
ii. Evidence of a concern among leaders for the shadow of the future

b. **Outcomes**
   
i. Evidence that new information alters prior perceptions, policies or behavior in the security realm
   
ii. Evidence that regime-type arrangements effectively lowers the costs of acquiring critical information
   
iii. Evidence of regime-constraining effects on traditional behaviors and interests
Security Community . . .

a. Consciousness
   i. Density of transactions
   ii. Extent of transactions
   iii. Evidence of "we-feeling"
   iv. Evidence of Trust
   v. Evidence of shared images

a. Impact on Significant Groups
   i. Evidence of these issues revealing themselves in key policy making groups or in public
   ii. Evidence of changes in self-conception, conceptions of others, and conceptions of future relations with others.
. . . Security Community

a. Outcomes

i. Evidence of convergent interests

ii. Evidence of spillover when agreement is not reached in one area

iii. Overall decrease in tensions
Human Security: What should we see?

- Growing normative concerns
- Among which polities, publics, international institutions
- What kind of policies
- What kinds of progress, where
- Whose consciousness must change?
Conclusions . . .

a. History of strategy has implications for re-conceptualizing security
b. Targets, Coherence, and Audiences are critical and closely related
c. We need metrics for gauging progress
d. How are we doing re: human security, environmental security etc.?
. . . Conclusions

a. What other conceptions have “strategic value?”
   i. Security “Insurance”
   ii. Long-term security
   iii. Social Security

b. Advantages and Disadvantages of Dropping “Security” Label
   i. Human Rights
   ii. Slavery
   iii. Civil Rights